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It is a fundamental principle of American jurisprudence that ju-
rors are to be chosen from a representative cross section of the com-
munity. This maxim has been articulated in cases construing the
sixth amendment right to a jury trial, I the equal protection guaran-
tee,2 and the Supreme Court's supervisory power over federal
courts. 3 Nevertheless, young adults are substantially under-
represented on the nation's jury rolls.4 In some jurisdictions, the
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University. A.B. 1966, Amherst College; J.D. 1969,
Columbia University.-Ed.
t The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Richard Faust, Josephine Carl-
son, Jay Schulman, Eric Swanson, Gerard Gilbride, Elissa Krause, Lee O'Brien, and the Na-
tional Jury Project in designing the public opinion survey described herein, in supervising its
administration, in analyzing the data, and in presenting the results. Special thanks are ex-
tended to the many volunteers who conducted the survey. The author also gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance of Anne Foner. This research was undertaken for a lawsuit challenging
the exclusion of young adults from the grand jury rolls in Queens County, New York. See
notes 5, 6, Part III infra. The litigation was conducted by the author while he was Attorney-in-
Charge, Special Litigation Unit, The Legal Aid Society of the City of New York. The litiga-
tion became moot due to substantial alteration in Queens County grand jury selection proce-
dures mandated by a change in state law. See N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 500-23 (McKinney Supp.
1978).
1. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526-31 (1975).
2. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
3. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). The principle is now also
recognized by the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, §§ 101-04, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74
(1976).
4. The pattern may be observed from Maine to California. See, e.g., United States v. Ross,
468 F.2d 1213, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 1972), cer. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973) (persons aged 21-24
substantially excluded from federal petit jury panels in the Northern District of California);
Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141, 143-44 (7th Cir. 1972) (persons under age 25 inade-
quately represented on federal petit and grand jury rolls in the Eastern Division of the North-
ern District of Illinois); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 569 n. 13 (Ist Cir. 1970) (young
adults aged 21-34 underrepresented on federal grand jury rolls for the District of Maine);
Quadra v. Superior Court, 378 F. Supp. 605, 622-23 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (young adults aged 21-40
substantially underrepresented on state grand jury rolls for County of San Francisco); United
States v. Briggs, 366 F. Supp. 1356, 1362 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (young people aged 21-29 under-
represented on federal petit jury rolls for the Northern District of Florida); United States v.
Gargan, 314 F. Supp. 414,415-16 (W.D. Wis. 1970), affd. sub nonz. United States v. Gast, 457
F.2d 141 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972) (persons aged 18-21 totally excluded and
those aged 21-26 substantially underrepresented on federal grand jury rolls for the Western
District of Wisconsin); Julian v. State, 134 Ga. App. 592, 594, 215 S.E.2d 496, 497 (1975) (93%
of grand jury pool consisted of white males whose average age was 69 years). Data docu-
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young are victims of overt discrimination.5 In others, selection pro-
cedures neutral on their face systematically exclude young adults.
Maintaining juror pools permanently,6 or even for two to four
years,7 results in underrepresentation of the young, as does using
source lists on which the young are not adequately represented.8
menting the underrepresentation of young adults on petit and grand jury rolls in 12 federal
judicial districts and in 29 cities and counties in 14 different states are presented in J. VAN
DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 331 app. H (1977).
5. The young sometimes are excluded by law. Five states-Mississippi, Missouri, Ne-
braska, Rhode Island and Utah-still require jurors to be 21 years old. Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 13-5-1 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 494.010 (1969); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (1975); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-9-1 (Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-46-8 (1977). For a discussion of such
exclusion, see note 171 infra.
Occasionally, juror selection officials openly admit that they discriminate. For example,
until recently New York County officials did not solicit anyone under 35 to serve on a grand
jury. United States ex rel. Chestnut v. Criminal Court, 442 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971). Similarly, until new procedures went into effect January 1, 1978,
officials in Queens County, New York, asked only older people if they wished to volunteer for
grand jury service. Stipulated Factual Statement 42, Johnson v. Durante, No. 73C 1159-EN
(E.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 3, 1973). The Deputy Commissioner of Jurors in Erie County, New
York, automatically exempted those who indicated on their questionnaires that they were stu-
dents, People v. Attica Bros., 79 Misc. 2d 492, 495, 359 N.Y.S.2d 699, 704 (Sup. Ct. 1974),
while the Assistant Commissioner of Jurors in Albany County, New York, did not even send
questionnaires to persons listed as students in town directories, People v. Marr, 67 Misc. 2d
113, 115, 324 N.Y.S.2d 608, 611 (Just. Ct. 1971). Seealso Anderson v. Casscles, 531 F.2d 682
(2d Cir. 1976).
6. The maintenance of permanent juror pools inevitably causes severe underrepresentation
of young people. In Queens County, New York, for example, juror officials maintained a
permanent pool of approximately 6,000 grand jurors. Only approximately 350 new grand ju-
rors were placed in the pool each year. Stipulated Factual Statement 48-49, Johnson v.
Durante, No. 73C 1159-EN (E.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 3, 1973). Even if young adults had been
proportionately represented among the new jurors, the passage of time would have ensured
that the jury pool was composed primarily of older people. The maintenance of the permanent
pool, together with the discriminatory practices described in note 5 supra, produced a striking
underrepresentation of the young on the Queens grand jury rolls. Although persons aged 18-
30 made up 27.0% of the eligible population, only 5.3% of persons on the 1975 rolls were in
that age group. Stipulated Factual Statement 60, 65a, Johnson v. Durante, No. 73C 1159-
EN (E.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 3, 1973).
People v. Bartlett, 89 Misc. 2d 874, 881-83, 393 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871-72 (Sup. Ct. 1977), con-
demned petit jury selection procedures on Staten Island, New York, which operated to exclude
young people in much the same way as the procedures in Queens. The court stated:
Richmond County has not fully reconstituted its jury pool since 1940. Once the pool
stabilized at 18,000, no new persons were added except to replace those who died or other-
wise no longer qualified. These replacements, even if statistically reflecting the age of the
community at the time added, never amounted to more than 2,000 persons in any year
and could not balance off the aging panel.
89 Misc. 2d at 882, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
7. The 1972 amendment to the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 allows each federal
judicial district to maintain a pool ofjurors for up to four years. Act of Apr. 6, 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-269, § 2, 86 Stat. 117 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(4) (1976)). Although the young as
a whole are not as severely underrepresented in such pools as they are in permanent pools,
persons aged 18-21 are nevertheless totally excluded from service by the fourth year of their
use. See text at notes 140-41 infra.
8. Both federal and state courts rely predominantly upon voter rolls as a source ofjurors,
See J. VAN DYKE, 257 app. A, 261 app. B. Young adults, however, generally are un-
derrepresented on the nation's voter rolls. One study demonstrated that only 58.1% of per-
sons aged 18-20, 59.5% of persons aged 21-24 and 66.1% of persons aged 25-29 register to vote,
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Moreover, the young may be less willing to serve than their el-
ders9-service can interfere with schooling or child care and can be
economically burdensome. 10 Finally, the great mobility" of young
people makes it difficult to solicit them for jury service.
Courts generally have failed to correct underrepresentation of the
young, and commentators have had little to say about it. Judges
have lamented the underrepresentation caused by the unwillingness
of the young to serve but have declined to remedy it, 12 since the law
requires only that the selection process begin with a representative
cross section and that identifiable groups not be intentionally or sys-
tematically excluded. 13 Where complaints have demonstrated that
underrepresentation was either intentional or systematic, courts usu-
ally have denied relief on the ground that young people are not a
sufficiently distinct and cohesive group to be "cognizable" for jury
selection purposes. 14 Thus, underrepresentation of the young has
been largely insulated from challenge.
while as many as 80.2% of those aged 55-64 register. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 253, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION
OF NOVEMBER 1972 (1973). See also Alker, Hosticka & Mitchell, Jury Selection as a Biased
SocialProcess, 11 LAW & SocY. REv. 9 (1976). Nonetheless, virtually every court which has
considered the exclusive use of voter rolls has approved the practice. See, e.g., Murrah v.
Arkansas, 532 F.2d 105, 106 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. James, 528 F.2d 999, 1022 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 959 (1977); United States v. Lewis, 472 F.2d 252, 256 (3d Cir.
1973); United States v. Guzman, 468 F.2d 1245, 1248 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937
(1973); United States v. Gast, 457 F.2d 141, 142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972);
United States v. Parker, 428 F.2d 488, 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 910 (1970); People
v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 749-5 1, 497 P.2d 1121, 1148-49, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 412-13 (1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973); People v. Breckenridge, 52 Cal. App. 3d 913, 921, 125 Cal. Rptr.
425, 429 (1975). A compendium of such cases may be found in J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at
77 n.18. At least one court has ordered supplementation of voter lists, Ford v. Hollowell, 385 F.
Supp. 1392, 1399-400 (N.D. Miss. 1974). Another has endorsed the proposition that "[t]he
voting list is not the end sought but only the means used to ensure that all cognizable groups
within the populace are represented on juries. The voting list cannot be adequate if some
groups are significantly underrepresented, regardless of the cause." United States v. Armsbury,
408 F. Supp. 1130, 1140 (D. Ore. 1976).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v.
DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 389 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969); United States
v. Leonetti, 291 F. Supp. 461, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
10. See generally J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 124, 391-94 app. K.
11. In a typical year, 42.6% of persons between the ages of 20 and 24 change their resi-
dence, while only 9.1% of those aged 45 to 64 move. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1973, at 37 (94th ed. 1974).
12. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1335-36 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 947 (1976); United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F. 2d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 934 (1969).
13. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208
(1965); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). On a broader view, however,
systematic exclusion might subsume exclusion due to unwillingness to serve as well as exclu-
sion directly due to state practices.
14. See Part II infra. On cognizability for jury selection purposes generally, see J. VAN
DYKE, supra note 4, at 47-49, 62-72; Gewin, An Analysis of Jury Selection Decisions, printed in
Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 811 app., at 819-28 (5th Cir. 1975); Kairys, Juror Selection: The
Law, a Mathematical Method ofAnalysis, and a Case Study, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, 780-82
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A leading case has held that a group is cognizable if it has a defi-
nite composition, is cohesive, and if its exclusion might result in bias
by juries hearing cases in which group members are involved.1 5 This
Article contends that young adults meet these requirements and
therefore are entitled to judicial review of the merits of their under-
representation claims.' 6 The young are a distinct and identifiable
group. They share attitudes, ideas, and experiences which are not
adequately expressed on jury panels on which the young are under-
represented. Such underrepresentation thus produces bias against
young criminal defendants and distorts deliberation.
In support of its thesis, this Article presents what the literature
has failed to provide: a comprehensive analysis of the concept of
cognizability and empirical data. Part I traces the history of
cognizability; identifies the sources of the cross-sectional right; and
defines the criteria of cognizability, drawing special attention to the
interests which a designation of cognizability protects. Part I also
discusses the different approaches courts have taken to cognizability
and suggests several factors which may explain the many treatments
of the concept.
Part II reviews the case law concerning the cognizability of
young adults in particular. That Part also examines the traditional
criteria of cognizability.
Part III demonstrates that young adults satisfy the criteria of
cognizability. The practical problem of defining age groups is ad-
dressed and the importance of age in determining general attitudes
and outlook is explained. Since part of the rationale for broad repre-
sentation on jury panels is that the quality of deliberation and the
results it produces are at stake, this Article offers evidence directly
related to that question-the results of a public-opinion survey of
attitudes on matters of signal importance to jury service.' 7 Analysis
of the data reveals significant and consistent differences in attitudes
among persons in different age groups on criminal justice issues in
general and on petit and grand jury service in particular. The great-
(1972); Comment, Underrepresentation ofEconomic Groups on Federal Juries, 57 B.U.L. REV.
198 (1977); Note, Federal Courts-Juror Selection-Underrepresentation of Young Adults on
Juror Source Lists, 19 WAYNE L. REV. 1287 (1973); Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge:
Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1735-38 (1977).
15. United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973).
16. This Article does not discuss the correctness of decisions which have reached the merits
and rejected jury discrimination claims by the young. Its concern is cognizability.
17. See Part IV infra.
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est disparities in attitudes are between the youngest (18-30) and the
oldest (61-75) age groups, and both groups are remarkably cohesive
in their attitudes toward the issues probed. (Not surprisingly, older
people are much more likely to be biased against the young than are
younger people.) Finally, the data show that the correlations be-
tween attitudes and age are significantly stronger than the correla-
tions between attitudes and race, sex, occupation, or income. Since
racial groups, women, and, on occasion, occupational and income
groups have been held cognizable, the data strongly suggest that
young adults are cognizable a fortiori.
I. THE CONCEPT OF COGNIZABILITY
A. Historical Development
The right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the commu-
nity is violated only by discrimination against "cognizable" groups.
The right itself has several statutory and constitutional sources.
Definitions of cognizability have therefore occurred in several differ-
ent contexts. Although cognizability was originally an equal
protection concept,18 it has also been employed by the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its federal supervisory powers to define the
scope of the right to a jury trial in federal courts in both civil 19 and
criminal20 cases. The Jury Selection and Service Act of 196821
specifically declares the cross-sectional ideal to be federal policy.
22
More recently, the Supreme Court's holding that state courts are
bound by the sixth amendment's fair-cross-section requirement
23
created yet another forum for the application of the concept.
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of cognizability in
1879 in Strauder v. West Virginia.24 A black defendant sought to
remove his criminal case to federal court on the ground that blacks
were explicitly barred from jury service by state law.25 In sustaining
the defendant's equal protection objection, the Court identified a
number of constitutional values impaired by the exclusion.
18. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 476-82 (1954); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 307-10 (1879).
19. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
20. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
21. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, §§ 101-04, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74 (1976).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976).
23. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
24. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
25. A removal statute permitted defendants who were denied their civil rights in state
courts to remove their cases to federal court. 100 U.S. at 311.
June 1978] 1049
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First, barring blacks from juries endangered the defendant's right
to a fair trial. The Court reasoned that if a black defendant were
tried by a jury from which all blacks were excluded, decisions might
be made not by an impartial assessment of the facts but on the basis
of the defendant's race: "It is well known that prejudices often exist
against particular classes in the community, which sway the judg-
ment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny
to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection
which others enjoy."' 26 Second, excluding blacks from juries injured
members of the excluded class. To deny "the privilege of participat-
ing equally . . in the administration of justice" 27 stigmatized the
entire excluded group, even those who might not wish to participate.
It implied that they are unfit for service, and was "practically a
brand upon them. . an assertion of their inferiority .. "28
Strauder assumed that blacks were cognizable for jury selection
purposes. It took judicial notice of the effects of past discrimination
and of the need to protect blacks against continuing bias. But the
Court in dictum limited cognizability to racial groups:
We do not say that within the limits from which it is not excluded by
the amendment a State may not prescribe the qualifications of its ju-
rors, and in so doing make discriminations. It may confine the selec-
tion to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons within certain ages,
or to persons having educational qualifications. We do not believe the
Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit this.29
The Court did not discuss the issue of cognizability again until
the 1940s. 30 Then, in a series of four decisions, it enumerated new
cognizable groups and identified additional interests protected by
26. 100 U.S. at 309.
27. 100 U.S. at 308.
28. 100 U.S. at 308.
29. 100 U.S. at 310. The Court intimated that racial or ethnic groups other than blacks
also are cognizable: "Nor if a law should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen
[from jury service], would there be any doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of the [four-
teenth] amendment." 100 U.S. at 308.
30. During the intervening years, the Supreme Court generally was unreceptive to jury
challenges. The Court did condemn state statutes authorizing racial discrimination in juror
selection. See, e.g., Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1880). In addition, the Court occasionally reversed a conviction and remanded for further
proceedings when the state court refused even to hear evidence of alleged racial discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1903); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
More often, however, the Court relied upon procedural barriers to deny relief. Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880), and Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896), held that the re-
moval statute used in Strauder was not available where jury officials had excluded blacks from
juries because of their race without authority derived from the state constitution or laws. The
proper remedy for challenging such defacto discrimination, the Court stated, was by way of a
motion to quash the indictment, and if necessary, through normal state appellate procedures.
Relief therefore was denied in both cases. Similarly, In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891), held
that federal habeas corpus was not available to a state prisoner who had not properly
1050 [Vol. 76:1045
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fully representative juries. In Smith v. Texas,3' an equal protection
challenge to grand jury selection procedures, the Court reiterated the
value of a cross-sectional jury, which it had recognized at least im-
plicitly in Strauder.32 "It is part of the established tradition in the
use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body
truly representative of the community, '33 the Court stated. "For ra-
cial discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of
otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Constitution and the
laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic concepts of a dem-
ocratic society and a representative government.
'34
Glasser v. United States35 applied these principles in interpreting
the right to jury trial in federal courts.36 Under the federal jury se-
lection statute then in force, jurors in federal courts were to have the
qualifications of jurors in the highest court of the state in which the
federal court resided.37 When Illinois amended its laws to make wo-
men eligible for jury service, federal jury officials sought to supple-
presented his claims in state court so as to obtain ultimate Supreme Court review through
normal channels.
The Court also imposed substantial evidentiary barriers to jury-discrimination claims.
When defendants made detailed written allegations that racial discrimination had caused the
virtual absence of blacks from petit and grand juries, state trial judges often summarily denied
the claims on the ground that such allegations were not proof. It is unclear, of course, how the
defendants were to prove their claims if denied a hearing at which to call witnesses and present
evidence. The Supreme Court generally affirmed. See Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906);
Brownfield v. South Carolina, 189 U.S. 426 (1903); Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519 (1903);
Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896). Furthermore, in cases where state courts conducted
hearings and found no racial discrimination despite clear evidence to the contrary, the Court
refused to grant relief unless the state court finding was so devoid of evidentiary support as to
amount to a denial of due process. See, e.g., Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278 (1909).
Finally, in the 1930s the Court relaxed its evidentiary standards and reversed two state
court decisions which had denied challenges to venires. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354
(1939); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). In both cases, defendants had offered evi-
dence of a virtual absence of blacks on juries coupled with a clear opportunity to discriminate
in the selection process. The Court held that such evidence constituted a prima facie case of
discrimination and that the evidence submitted by the states in each case failed to rebut de-
fendants' presentations. The prima facie case doctrine, as it relates to cognizability, is dis-
cussed in the text at notes 104-08 infra.
31. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
32. 100 U.S. at 308.
33. 311 U.S. at 130.
34. 311 U.S. at 130 (footnote omitted).
35. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
36. The Court's opinion might be viewed as resting upon statutory rather than constitu-
tional grounds since the selection procedure might have failed the Illinois requirement and
would then have failed the federal statutory requirement. But the constitutional nature of the
challenge, as well as the tone of the opinion, suggest that the sixth amendment at least strongly
influenced the Court and was probably the principal source of its opinion. See 315 U.S. at 84-
87. A recent case seems to support this sixth amendment interpretation. See Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
37. 315 U.S. at 64.
Michigan Law Review
ment their rolls with qualified women. Glasser alleged that the
women added to the rolls were drawn exclusively from a list fur-
nished by the Illinois League of Women Voters and prepared solely
from its membership. He further alleged that the women on the list
had attended "jury classes whose lecturers presented the views of the
prosecution.
38
The Court upheld Glasser's claim in principle, reasoning:
[Juror selection officials] must not allow the desire for competent
jurors to lead them into selections which do not comport with the con-
cept of the jury as a cross-section of the community....
The deliberate selection of jurors from the membership of particu-
lar private organizations definitely does not conform to the traditional
requirements of a jury trial . . . . [T]he dangers inherent in such a
method of selection are the more real when the members of those orga-
nizations from training or otherwise acquire a bias in favor of the pros-
ecution. The jury selected from the membership of such an
organization is then not only the organ of a special class, but, in addi-
tion, it is also openly partisan.
39
The Court ultimately denied Glasser's claim on the ground that he
had not offered sufficient evidence in support of his allegations.
40
The decision nonetheless reaffirmed the necessity of an impartial
jury and clearly recognized that racial and ethnic groups are not the
only significant components of a representative cross section.
In Thiel v. Southern Pacdfic Co.,a the Court, pursuant to its su-
pervisory power over the administration of justice in federal courts,
identified additional cognizable groups. The plaintiff, suing for
damages in a federal diversity case, moved to strike the jury venire
on the ground that lower-class working people had been systemati-
cally excluded and that only businessmen and others inclined toward
the employer's viewpoint were, therefore, on the rolls.42 A hearing
on the motion revealed that jury officials deliberately excluded from
the rolls everyone who worked for a daily wage. The Court held that
this practice failed to satisfy the principles of jury selection:
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection
with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an
impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. Smith v.
Texas.. .; Glasser v. United States ... .This does not mean, of
38. 315 U.S. at 84.
39. 315 U.S. at 86.
40. See 315 U.S. at 87.
41. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
42. Thiel, a passenger, had jumped out of the window of a moving train operated by the
Southern Pacific Company. He sought to recover damages on the ground that railroad em-
ployees were negligent in failing to keep safe a passenger so clearly "out of his normal mind."
328 U.S. at 218-19.
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course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the eco-
nomic, social, religious, racial, political and geographic groups of the
community; frequently such complete representation would be impos-
sible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by
court officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of
these groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible
for jury service are to be found in every stratum of society. Jury com-
petence is an individual rather than a group or class matter. That fact
lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the
door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to
the democratic ideals of trial by jury.
43
Thiel is the Court's most expansive treatment of cognizability.
The Court assumed that a broad range of groups are distinct and
identifiable, and that members of each share attitudes and exper-
iences which may not be adequately represented if they are excluded
from service. The Court did not require proof that the exclusion of
wage earners prejudiced Thiel. The mere danger of such prejudice
justified the Court, in the exercise of its supervisory powers, in order-
ing a new trial by a jury fairly chosen.
The Court's expansive approach continued in Ballard v. United
States,44 which involved a challenge to the intentional and system-
atic exclusion of women from the grand and petit jury rolls in the
Southern District of California. In sustaining the challenge, the
Court assumed that women are a cognizable group, without requir-
ing proof that women share attitudes or perspectives different from
men's:
It is said. . . that an all male panel drawn from the various groups
within a community will be as truly representative as if women were
included. The thought is that the factors which tend to influence the
action of women are the same as those which influence the action of
men-personality, background, economic status-and not sex. Yet it
is not enough to say that women when sitting as jurors neither act nor
tend to act as a class. Men likewise do not act as a class. But, if the
shoe were on the other foot, who would claim that a jury was truly
representative of the community if all men were intentionally and sys-
tematically excluded from the panel? The truth is that the two sexes
are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different
from a community composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence
one on the other is among the imponderables. To insulate the court-
room from either may not in a given case make an iota of difference.
Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded. The
exclusion of one may indeed make the jury less representative of the
43. 328 U.S. at 220.
44. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
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community than would be true if an economic or racial group were
excluded.
45
The Court also stated that the defendants' claim did not depend
on a showing of prejudice in the individual case, because "[t]he in-
jury is not limited to the defendant-there is injury to the jury sys-
tem, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to
the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts."
46
Again acting in the exercise of its federal supervisory powers, the
Court overturned the convictions.
Any hope that the standards enunciated in the 1940s would usher
in an era of representative juries dimmed when the Court next con-
sidered cognizability in 1954. Hernandez v. Texas47 signalled a
change in approach. Hernandez was indicted for murder and con-
victed in Jackson County, Texas. He alleged that Mexican-Ameri-
cans were systematically excluded from service as grand and petit
jurors in the county, thus depriving him of the equal protection of
the laws. Since he established a prima facie case of discrimination
which the state was unable to rebut, the Court reversed his convic-
tion. In considering his claim, however, the Court articulated new
criteria of cognizability:
Throughout our history differences in race and color have defined eas-
ily identifiable groups which have at times required the aid of the
courts in securing equal treatment under the laws. But community
prejudices are not static, and from time to time other differences from
the community norm may define other groups which need the same
protection. Whether such a group exists within a community is a ques-
tion of fact. When the existence of a distinct class is demonstrated, and
it is further shown that the laws, as written or as applied, single out that
class for different treatment not based on some reasonable classifica-
45. 329 U.S. at 193-94 (footnote omitted).
46. 329 U.S. at 195. In Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), there was no majority opinion,
but three justices elaborated on the interests protected by representative juries (opinion of
Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and Stewart, JJ.). In Peters, a white defendant challenged the
systematic exclusion of blacks from grand and petit juries in Muscogee County, Georgia. The
state argued that the defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion, but the Court concluded
that the argument took "too narrow a view of the kinds of harm that flow from discrimination
injury selection." 407 U.S. at 498. It stated that "the exclusion from jury service of a substan-
tial and identifiable class of citizens has a potential impact that is too subtle and too pervasive
to admit of confinement to particular cases." 407 U.S. at 503. The Court was unwilling to
assume that exclusion of blacks is relevant only to racial issues.
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service,
the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of
human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not
necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to
conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events
that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.
407 U.S. at 503-04.
47. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
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tion, the guarantees of the Constitution have been violated.48
The Court did not simply assume that Mexican-Americans were
a cognizable group. Instead, it held that Hernandez had an "initial
burden" of proving that "persons of Mexican descent constitute a
separate class in Jackson County, distinct from 'whites.' ",49 The
question whether this might be accomplished simply by judicial no-
tice, the Court observed in a footnote, was not before it.50 But the
Court stated that another way to establish cognizability was to show
the "attitude of the community."5' Hemandez satisfied that burden
by demonstrating that the community generally distinguished be-
tween "white" and "Mexican," that Mexican-Americans were less
involved than whites in business and community groups, that chil-
dren of Mexican descent had recently been required to attend a seg-
regated school, and that Mexican-Americans were discriminated
against in the use of dining and public toilet facilities.
5 2
Although Hernandez prevailed, the case marks the first potential-
ly limiting use of the cognizability concept. To be sure, Hernandez
permitted judicial notice of groups in appropriate cases. Nonethe-
less, the Court's opinion intimated that members of less easily
identifiable groups subjected to subtler forms of community bias
might have greater difficulty establishing their cognizability than in
the 1940s.5 3 And, in the years following Hernandez, courts have be-
come increasingly reluctant to find groups cognizable. Women and
various racial, ethnic, and religious groups have met with the most
success, while occupational, income, and geographical groups, and
groups defined by education or age generally have not been recog-
nized.
After Ballard, courts assumed that women were a cognizable
48. 347 U.S. at 478.
49. 347 U.S. at 479 (footnote omitted).
50. 347 U.S. at 479 n.9.
51. 347 U.S. at 479.
52. 347 U.S. at 479-80.
53. Although Hernandez is often interpreted as establishing more stringent proof require-
ments, in the case itself, cognizability enlarged, not limited, the cross-sectional right. When the
Court said that community prejudices were not static and that, at different times, different
groups might need the aid of the courts in securing equal treatment, 347 U.S. at 478, it was
responding to the view that only blacks are protected by the equal protection clause. In find-
ing that plaintiffs had convincingly shown that Mexican-Americans were a separate class in
Jackson County, distinct from whites, 347 U.S. at 479, the Court hardly meant to require such
complete proof for every equal protection challenge, since it expressly reserved the question
whether the cognizability of Mexican-Americans might have been judicially noticed. 347 U.S.
at 479 n.9. Both the explicit language and the tenor of the opinion suggest that the Court
viewed the identifiability "requirement" as expanding, not limiting, the equal protection guar-
antee. If this suggestion is true, Hernandez should not be interpreted as imposing rigorous
proof requirements where none previously existed.
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group,54 and condemned their intentional exclusion from juries.55
Until recently, however, states were allowed to grant women blanket
exemptions solely because of their sex or could even make registra-
tion for jury duty a prerequisite of service for women but not for
men.56 In 1975, Taylor v. Louisiana57 firmly rejected such discrimi-
nations. The Court held that the sixth amendment was violated by a
state law which permitted women to serve on juries only if they had
previously declared their interest in jury service and which resulted
in the complete exclusion of women from the venire.
Taylor is particularly important because it relies on the sixth
amendment. Although the Court had previously held that the sixth
amendment was binding upon the states by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment, 58 Taylor established for the first time that "the selection
of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is
an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial."59 In reaching this conclusion, the Court found "instructive"
its prior cases involving the equal protection clause and the exercise
of supervisory powers over federal trials, 60 and it reaffirmed some of
the policies supporting the requirement of a fair cross section:
The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary
power--to make available the commonsense judgment of the commu-
nity as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in
preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased re-
sponse of a judge .... This prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the
jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace or if
large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool. Community par-
ticipation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not
only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to pub-
lic confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Restricting
54. See, e.g., United States v. Zirpolo, 450 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1971); Ford v. White, 430 F.2d
951, 955 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 1970); United
States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 934 (1969).
55. See United States v. Zirpolo, 450 F.2d 424, 428 (3d Cir. 1971); Abbott v. Mines, 411
F.2d 353, 355 (6th Cir. 1969); Mayfield v. Steed, 345 F. Supp. 806, 808 (E.D. Ark. 1972), affd
per curiam, 473 F.2d 691 (8th Cir. 1973); White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401, 408 (M.D. Ala.
1966).
56. In Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961), for example, the Supreme Court approved a
statute which provided that "the name of no female person shall be taken for jury service
unless said person has registered with the clerk of the circuit court her desire to be placed on
the jury list." 368 U.S. at 58. Noting that the law "does not purport to exclude women from
state jury service," 368 U.S. at 60, the Court found the statute to be based on a reasonable
classification since "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life." 368 U.S.
at 62.
57. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
58. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
59. 419 U.S. at 528.
60. 419 U.S. at 526-28.
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jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments
playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the con-
stitutional concept of jury trial.
61
Applying these principles, the Court found that women are
"sufficiently numerous and distinct from men," le., that they are
cognizable. 62 It concluded that, as in Ballard, the systematic exclu-
sion of women rendered the jury less representative in a subtle but
substantial way and violated the fair-cross-section requirement.
63
The Court conceded that an earlier case, Hoyt v. Florida,64 had held
that a similar discrimination did not violate the due process or equal
protection guarantees since the state interest in preserving a distinct
societal role for women was a sufficiently rational basis for the exclu-
sion.
65
But Hoyt did not involve a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community .... The right
to a proper jury cannot be overcome on merely rational grounds.
There must be weightier reasons if a distinctive class representing 53%
of the eligible jurors is for all practical purposes to be excluded from
jury service.
66
This passage suggests that Taylor established a broader cross-sec-
tional right under the sixth amendment than under the equal protec-
tion clause. On the other hand, the Court may simply have been
searching for some facially plausible ground for distinguishing Hoyt.
It remains to be seen whether Taylor will be interpreted as broaden-
ing the concept of cognizability in sixth amendment cases.
B. Different Approaches to the Cognizability of Particular Groups
Courts have often simply taken judicial notice of the
cognizability of racial, ethnic, and religious groups. For example,
courts have assumed the cognizability of Indians in Mellette County,
South Dakota;67 of Mexican-Americans in Logan County, Colo-
rado;68 of Puerto Ricans in St. Croix, Virgin Islands; 69 and of non-
61. 419 U.S. at 530.
62. 419 U.S. at 531.
63. 419 U.S. at 530. The Court was impressed with evidence that "women bring to juries
their own perspectives and values that influence both jury deliberation and result." 419 U.S. at
532 n.12.
64. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
65. 419 U.S. at 533-34. See note 56 supra.
66. 419 U.S. at 534.
67. State v. Plenty Horse, 85 S.D. 401, 184 N.W.2d 654 (1971).
68. Montoya v. People, 141 Colo. 9, 345 P.2d 1062 (1959).
69. United States ex rel. Leguillo v. Davis, 115 F. Supp. 392, 398 (D.V.I. 1953), revd on
other grounds, 212 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1954).
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Caucasians in Hawaii. 70 Similarly, the opinion in Quadra v. Superior
Court7 ' assumed that racial groups are cognizable "under judicial
notice of obvious sociological facts throughout this nation. '72 With
respect to religious groups, some courts have stated without discus-
sion that Jews,73 Catholics,74 and persons who do not believe in a
supreme being75 are cognizable.
In United States v. DeAlba-Conrado,7 6 on the other hand, the
court remanded the case for a hearing on whether Latin-Americans
constitute a cognizable group in Miami, Florida.77 And in Quadra,
although the court expressed little doubt "that persons of Latin-
American descent and of Chinese and Japanese ethnic origin are
identifiable groups within San Francisco,' 78 it refrained from decid-
ing whether to take judicial notice of their cognizability or to require
plaintiffs to submit proof at a later hearing.7 9 Finally, in Grech v.
Wainwright,80 the court stated that proof of cognizability of mem-
bers of the Jewish faith in the geographical areas from which the
jury was drawn was critical to the constitutional claim of jury exclu-
sion.81
Courts generally have held occupational groups cognizable
where the discrimination was similar to that proscribed in Thiel. For
example, People v. White82 assumed the cognizability of "hourly
70. United States v. Fujimoto, 105 F. Supp. 727 (D. Hawaii 1952). In State v. Lopez, 182
Kan. 46, 318 P.2d 662 (1957), the court assumed that Mexican-Americans generally are a cog-
nizable group. The Court declined to find them cognizable in Geary County, Kansas, how-
ever, because defendant was unable to establish that this ethnic group made up a significant
portion of the community. The 1950 census figures revealed that of a total population of
21,671, only 92 were of "other races." The Court concluded that "the Mexican population, if
any, in Geary County was not large enough to raise a presumption of systematic exclusion
from jury service." 182 Kan. at 51, 318 P.2d at 665.
71. 378 F. Supp. 605 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
72. 378 F. Supp. at 618 n.19.
73. Schowgurow v. State, 240 Md. 121,213 A.2d 475 (1965). See also State v. Madison, 240
Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965).
74. United States v. Suskin, 450 F.2d 596, 599 (2d Cir. 1971).
75. Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 S.W. 1091 (1925).
76. 481 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1973).
77. 481 F.2d at 1270 n.7.
78. 378 F. Supp. at 618 n.19.
79. 378 F. Supp. at 618 n.19. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977), and Muniz v.
Beto, 434 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1970), found that the defendants had submitted adequate
proof of the cognizability of Mexican-Americans in the Texas counties of Hidalgo and El Paso,
respectively. Similarly, State v. Villafane, 164 Conn. 637, 645, 325 A.2d 251, 256 (1973), found
that the record established the cognizability of Puerto Ricans in Fairfield County, Connecticut.
80. 492 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1974).
81. 492 F.2d at 749 n.3.
82. 43 Cal. 2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1954) (en banc).
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wage earners and those of less fortunate economic circumstances" 83
in condemning the selection of jurors from lists of local clubs and
associations whose members, for the most part, were well-to-do busi-
nessmen.84 Similarly, Simmons v. State85 assumed the cognizability
of "common laborers" in barring their intentional, systematic exclu-
sion from the jury rolls in Aluchua County Florida.
86
In other cases, however, courts have refused to recognize occupa-
tional or income groups because the group in question was inade-
quately defined or because proof of community attitudes toward the
group was lacking. In Quadra, for example, plaintiffs challenged the
underrepresentation of low-income blue-collar workers. The court
dismissed the claim because the plaintiffs had made "virtually no
effort to define this class as a distinct, identifiable group in the com-
munity. ' 87 The Court held that the plaintiffs had not drawn a ra-
tional line between blue-collar and white-collar workers and that the
low-income class they attempted to construct was "too imprecise and
undoubtedly over-inclusive" given the relatively high wages -paid
many workers in craft occupations. 88 Finally, the plaintiffs had
failed to allege facts pertaining to community attitudes which would
"give some content" to the group.8 9
Similarly, United States v. MeDanies90 refused to recognize ei-
ther the poor or food-stamp recipients as cognizable under the fed-
eral Jury Selection and Service Act.91 The Court stressed that any
line dividing the poor from the affluent is inherently arbitrary, since
"there is no national standard of who is poor and who is not poor.
'92
The Court also noted that one's economic status may change from
83. 43 Cal. 2d at 753, 278 P.2d at 17.
84. The Court ultimately denied relief on the ground that all occupational and income
groups seemed adequately represented on the actual venire of 525 persons from which the jury
was chosen. 43 Cal. 2d at 753, 278 P.2d at 17.
85. 182 So. 2d 442 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966).
86. See also Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 713-14, 719-24 (5th Cir. 1966) (en banc), cert
denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967) (court assumed cognizability of daily wage earners, a group com-
prised of manual laborers and outside workers).
87. 378 F. Supp. at 621.
88. 378 F. Supp. at 621. The Census Bureau's categorization of occupational titles is useful
in solving this problem. The system developed from the 1970 census consists of 441 specific
occupation categories arranged into 12 major occupation groups. Information on the composi-
tion of the detailed categories is given in U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF
POPULATION, CLASSIFIED INDEX OF INDUSTRIES AND OCCUPATIONS (1971).
89. 378 F. Supp. at 621. See also People v. Navarette, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1064, 1077, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 55, 63-64, (1976).
90. 370 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. La. 1973).
91. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74 (1976).
92. 370 F. Supp. at 307.
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year to year and that "the elusiveness of the concept [of poverty] and
the changes in purchasing power of money make the use of such a
classification difficult. ' 93 Finally, since no proof was submitted that
food-stamp recipients share attitudes or opinions different from
those of other groups, the Court found the classification meaningless
for jury selection purposes.
94
Similar reasoning also may underlie the reluctance of courts to
consider educational groups cognizable. Many courts have stressed
the absence of proof that the uneducated share distinct attitudes or
characteristics which set them apart from the rest of society and
which cannot be adequately represented by the educated. 95 The
view that the uneducated are not necessary to a representative cross
section also may stem from the belief that juries perform better with-
out them. Thus, courts have uniformly approved minimum educa-
tional requirements for jurors.
96
Many of the expansive earlier pronouncements on cognizability
involved the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory powers over
federal trials. Although these early decisions generally relied little
upon the language of the applicable federal statute,97 the passage of
the Jury Selection and Service Act98 in 1968 gave federal courts
more explicit guidance for determining cognizability. The Act de-
clared it to be federal policy "that all litigants in federal courts enti-
93. 370 F. Supp. at 308.
94. See also United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977).
95. E.g., United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 905 (9th Cir. 1977). United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970),
recognized such a group. The Court noted the difficulty in defining precisely a less educated
group, but held that "the less educated are a sufficiently large group with sufficiently distinct
views and attitudes that its diluted presence on the actual jury pools requires explanation."
420 F.2d at 571.
96. See, e.g., Carter v. Jury Commn., 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162
U.S. 565, 589 (1896); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
Courts also have refused to hold geographical groups cognizable. Although such groups
are relatively easy to define, United States v. Bryant, 291 F. Supp. 542, 551 (D. Me. 1968),
complainants normally have been unable to demonstrate that people in different parts of a
district have significantly different attitudes or that there is likely to be bias in the absence of a
residential cross section. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1336 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 572 (1st Cir. 1970); Quadra
v. Superior Court, 378 F. Supp. 605, 619-21 (N.D. Cal. 1974); State v. Townsend, 167 Conn.
539, 548-50, 356 A.2d 125, 132-34 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 846 (1975); People v. Chesler,
91 Misc. 2d 551, 557, 398 N.Y.S.2d 320, 324 (Sup. Ct. 1977). If discrimination by residence
results in underrepresentation of other identifiable groups, a designation of residential
cognizability might be a convenient way to alleviate that problem. In most instances, however,
it is easier to address underrepresentation of other groups directly.
97. The earlier federal statute gave almost no guidance to federal courts, since it simply
incorporated state standards. Judicial Code, ch. 231, §§ 275-278, 36 Stat. 1164, 1165 (1911).
98. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (codified at
§§ 101-04, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74 (1976)).
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tled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries
selected at random from a fair cross section of the community
• . ."99 and that "[nlo citizen shall be excluded from [federal jury]
service. . . on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
or economic status."' 0 Courts have generally interpreted these pro-
visions as stricter than the constitutional fair-cross-sectional require-
ment and have held that compliance with the statute constitutes
compliance with the Constitution. 101 And its procedural specificity
and breadth of purpose have encouraged courts to employ the stat-
ute rather than the vaguer supervisory power as the standard for jury
challenges in federal courts.10 2 Nevertheless, reliance on the federal
statute has not led courts to interpret cognizability much more gener-
ously than in constitutional cases. 103
C. Possible Explanations of the Conflicting Lines of Authority
It is difficult to harmonize the divergent and often conflicting
lines of authority interpreting the cross-sectional ideal. In some
cases, courts have freely taken judicial notice that a group is cogniza-
ble. In others, they have required proof of cognizability and been
sensitive to line-drawing problems. A number of factors may ex-
plain these differences in approach, especially the recent reluctance
of the courts either to extend the list of groups considered cognizable
or even to recognize groups previously considered identifiable. An
examination of these factors, however, suggests that none of them
provides a valid basis for that reluctance.
The first possible explanation for the divergent judicial ap-
proaches and outcomes is that they may vary according to the nature
of the proof offered to support or refute the claim of discrimination.
In Thiel and similar cases, in which challenges to juries were sus-
tained, the defendants explicitly admitted there had been intentional
or systematic exclusion of persons in specific occupations or social
strata. But in cases such as Quadra and McDaniels, in which chal-
lenges failed, those challenging selection procedures had had to rely
on the prima facie case doctrine. Since its first application in
1935,1°4 that doctrine has been a formidable weapon in challenges to
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 584 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 142-43 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 937 (1973).
102. See United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 574-75 (1st Cir. 1970).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 585-86 (10th Cir. 1976).
104. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935), discussed in note 30 supra.
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unrepresentative juries. But the very strength of the doctrine may
have worked to undermine it. Courts may fear that if they find
many occupational and income groups cognizable, the presence and
effectiveness of the doctrine may inspire innumerable challenges to
jury selection procedures.
The prima facie case doctrine offers plaintiffs several advantages
over traditional modes of proof. First, direct proof of discrimination
is not required. A showing of significant disparities between the
composition of the jury rolls and the composition of the community,
coupled with a showing that jury officials had an opportunity to dis-
criminate in the selection process, establishes a prima facie case and
shifts the burden to jury officials to prove that the disparities resulted
from something other than discrimination. 10 5 Since mere affirma-
tions of good faith are not a sufficient rebuttal,10 6 jury officials often
are hard pressed to sustain their burden. Second, the challenger de-
fines the class. In cases of admitted, intentional discrimination, jury
officials "define" the excluded group by their statements and actions.
In a prima facie case, by contrast, a broader range of challenges nor-
mally is plausible since jury rolls in most jurisdictions under-
represent blacks, various ethnic groups, women, the young, the old,
the uneducated, the poor, and many occupational groups.107
Of course, courts can regulate the use of the prima facie case doc-
trine by declining to hold the groups in question cognizable. Con-
cern about abuse of the doctrine, however, does not justify a narrow
interpretation of cognizability. Abuse could more effectively be min-
imized by requiring that a greater disparity be shown to establish a
prima facie case or by easing the defendant's burden on rebuttal.
Limiting cognizability is clumsy and perpetuates unrepresentative
juries.'0 8
The second reason for courts' reluctance to hold groups cogniza-
ble may be their confusion of the concepts of cognizability and sus-
pectness. Both concepts protect identifiable groups from
discrimination, but the similarity ends there. To say, for example,
that legislative or administrative classifications based on socioeco-
nomic status are suspect means that all such governmental classifica-
105. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.
625, 630-32 (1972).
106. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,498 n.19 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.
625, 632 (1972).
107. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 291-371 apps. F-I.
108. Of course, any new restriction on the prima facie case doctrine might perpetuate un-
representative juries. But cognizability is a particularly unfortunate kind of restriction since it
entirely insulates discrimination against certain classes from any judicial protection.
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tions are subject to strict equal protection scrutiny and will fall
unless the government can show that they are necessary to promote a
compelling state interest. As Justice Marshall noted in his dissent to
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia:10 9
If a statute is subject to strict scrutiny, the statute always, or nearly
always, . . . is struck down. . . . It should be no surprise, then, that
the Court is hesitant to expand the. . . classes subject to strict scrutiny,
when each expansion involves the invalidation of virtually every
classification bearing upon a newly covered category."10
To say, on the other hand, that low-income people are a cognizable
group has a much more limited effect. It merely means that they
may not be discriminated against injury selection. This difference in
consequence probably explains why women and racial, ethnic, and
religious groups, and on occasion, age, occupational, income and ed-
ucational groups, have been held cognizable for jury selection pur-
poses, while the only suspect classifications are those based on race,
alienage, or national origin."'
The courts have not applied the traditional two-tier model of
equal protection analysis to jury selection cases," 12 perhaps because
the concepts of cognizability and suspectness serve such different
purposes or perhaps because of the awkwardness of that model. In-
stead, courts have apparently held that discrimination against a cog-
nizable group is simply impermissible, but that discrimination
against a group which does not fully satisfy the cognizability criteria,
while perhaps undesirable, is not sufficiently important to merit judi-
cial intervention. It seems unlikely that courts will apply the two-tier
model in this area. Although theoretically applicable, it does not ma-
terially aid the evaluation or resolution of jury discrimination
claims, and it would have implications outside the jury area that
courts may wish to avoid. 113
109. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
110. 427 U.S. at 319 (footnote omitted).
111. See generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17-29 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 370-
72 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
8-12 (1967); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-47 (1948).
112. See, e.g., Quadra v. Superior Court, 378 F. Supp. 605, 616 n.15 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
113. The two-tier model could theoretically be applied by holding that discrimination
against a cognizable group can be justified only by showing that it is necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, while discrimination against a noncognizable group need
only have a rational basis. On this approach, however, a designation of cognizability amounts
to a finding that the group is suspect for jury selection purposes. Such a finding might be
viewed as a first step toward expanding the list of suspect classifications, something the present
Court seems disinclined to do. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (only four
Justices agree that sex is a suspect class); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (wealth discriminations do not involve a suspect class); Massachusetts.Bd. of
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Finally, the divergent lines of authority may be partly accounted
for by the fact that the cross-sectional right has several sources.
These include the sixth amendment, the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, and in federal courts, the Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968. In addition, the Supreme Court, in the ex-
ercise of its supervisory power over the federal courts, has required
that juries be composed of a fair cross section. The courts have not
explicitly stated that either the scope of cognizability or the kind or
quantum of proof required to establish a cognizable group varies de-
pending upon the source of the right. Nonetheless, there is some
evidence that such variations exist.
It is true that, to date, courts have treated cognizability in much
the same manner in sixth amendment and equal protection cases.
This is not surprising, since the interests protected are often coexten-
sive. In Strauder v. West Virginia,"t4 an equal protection case, the
court noted that racial discrimination injury selection endangers the
defendant's right to a fair trial"t5 and denies members of the ex-
cluded class the right to participate equally in the administration of
justice.16 Smith v. Texas,1 7 also an equal protection case, stressed
that a representative jury is important to "the use of juries as instru-
ments of public .lustice'' 118 and that exclusion of otherwise qualified
groups "is at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and
a representative government." 119 Hernandez v. Texas 20 held that
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam) (age is not a suspect classification). If,
on the other hand, discrimination against cognizable (but nonsuspect) groups is evaluated only
under the rational-basis test, the discrimination would doubtless be justified on the ground of
administrative convenience, and dismissal of the complaint would almost inevitably follow.
This latter injustice might be eased by applying an intermediate equal protection test, see
generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTTIONAL LAW §§ 16-30, 16-31 (1978), to jury discrim-
ination against cognizable (but nonsuspect) groups. The state practice would be upheld if it
substantially furthered an important governmental interest; administrative convenience would
be an insufficient justification. The Court has endorsed the general use of this test for gender
classifications, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), and four of the five members of the
Court who addressed the constitutional issue in University of California Bd. of Regents v.
Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2783-2785 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting), would apply the test to
benign racial preferences. Such a test perhaps is appropriate here. While not "suspect," cogni-
zable groups are by definition important segments of the community. Their total (or partial)
exclusion from juries implicates both the defendant's significant interest in an unbiased and
fair-cross-sectional jury and society's vital interest in preserving the democratic ideal of the
jury. An intermediate test might help reconcile theory with result in the jury discrimination
area. However, if the Court is unwilling to employ this standard, the two-tier equal protection
model seems wholly inapposite to jury discrimination claims.
114. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
115. 100 U.S. at 309.
116. 100 U.S. at 308.
117. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
118. 311 U.S. at 130.
119. 311 U.S. at 130.
120. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
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when distinct groups are singled out for different treatment without
justification, the equal protection clause is violated.' 2 ' The broad
language of Hernandez clearly encompasses the interests of both a
defendant who is a member of the excluded group and of other
group members as well.
Cases relying on the sixth amendment stress the same interests as
the equal protection cases. Glasser v. United States, 22 which appears
to be based on the sixth amendment,1 23 emphasized the defendant's
right to a jury which is not biased in favor of the prosecution. 24 It
also condemned a jury that is "the organ of a special class" as
incompatible with traditional democratic ideals. 25  Taylor v.
Louisiana,126 which explicitly relies on the sixth amendment, cites
the defendant's interest in an unbiased jury and the value of full
community participation in the administration of criminal law as the
interests protected by a fully representative jury.127 Thus, since des-
ignations of cognizability serve essentially the same interests whether
the source of the cross-sectional right is the equal protection clause
or the sixth amendment, the courts have properly used the cases
based on these two constitutional provisions interchangeably for
cognizability purposes.1
28
A difference in approaches to cognizability is observable, how-
ever, between cases involving the exercise of the Supreme Court's
121. 347 U.S. at 478.
122. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
123. See note 36 supra.
124. 315 U.S. at 86.
125. 315 U.S. at 86.
126. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
127. 419 U.S. at 530-31.
128. As noted earlier, one passage in Taylor does imply that there is a broader cross-sec-
tional right under the sixth amendment than under the equal protection clause. See text at
notes 63-66 supra. But the Court was attempting to distinguish Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961), a case it was effectively overruling. Thus, the Court's discussion should not be inter-
preted too liberally.
Of course, the sixth amendment and the equal protection clause donot apply coextensively
to all jury discrimination claims. By its terms, the sixth amendment only applies to criminal
juries, and even then only to petit juries. Although the fifth amendment's grand jury require-
ment might entail a fair-cross-sectional right in federal grand juries, see Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482, 509-10 (1977) (PoweU, J., dissenting), that fifth amendment requirement has not
yet been applied to the states. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). Thus it appears
that state grand jury and civil jury selection procedures are governed only by the equal protec-
tion clause. Moreover, the different nature of the injuries has created somewhat different
standing doctrines in sixth amendment and equal protection cases. Although a criminal de-
fendant who does not belong to the excluded class has standing in both types of cases, Taylor
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), a member of the
excluded class has standing to raise only an equal protection claim, Carter v. Jury Commn.,
396 U.S. 320 (1970), not a sixth amendment claim.
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supervisory power over the federal courts, and cases involving con-
stitutional rights. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. 129 and Ballard v.
United States, 30 which contain the Supreme Court's most expansive
treatments of cognizability, both rested on the supervisory power. In
Thiel, the Court took judicial notice that a broad range of groups are
cognizable,' 3' and it did not require proof that Thiel was prejudiced
by the exclusion of daily wage earners from his jury. Similarly, the
Court in Ballard needed no proof that women share attitudes or per-
spectives different from men; rather, it assumed that women are a
cognizable group. 132 The marked difference in approach between
these cases and later cases based on the Constitution may be attribut-
able to the source of the right. Comity and cautious constitutional
interpretation might explain the more conservative approach to
cognizability displayed in the later cases.
By its requirement that "[n]o citizen shall be excluded from [fed-
eral jury] service . . . on account of race, color, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, or economic status," 133 the federal Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968 apparently adopted the approach to
cognizability of the federal supervisory power cases. The statute,
however, has not led courts to interpret cognizability more liberally
than in constitutional cases.' 34 This conservatism is not easily ex-
plained. To be sure, not all potentially cognizable groups are pro-
tected from discrimination by section 1862 of the Act. Indeed, age
groups are conspicuously absent. But courts have not interpreted
that section as an exclusive enumeration of identifiable groups.
35
The fair-cross-sectional right established in section 1861 amply sup-
ports a broad interpretation of cognizability. Moreover, its legisla-
tive history reveals that Congress intended to adopt the broad view
of the cross-sectional right earlier expressed in Thief and other su-
pervisory cases.136 Thus, courts construing the federal statute should
129. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
130. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
131. 328 U.S. at 220.
132. 329 U.S. at 193-94.
133. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, § 102, 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976).
134. See United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 591-93 (10th Cir. 1976).
135. See Gewin, supra note 14, at 820-21. Section 1862 might be interpreted as expressing
a congressional finding that the enumerated groups are cognizable, and as justifying a court in
recognizing them by judicial notice. But it does not follow that courts should ignore proof that
other, nonenumerated groups are cognizable.
136. During the House debate many Congressmen supported the objective of obtaining a
representative cross section injury pools. For instance, Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, after citing Thiel, stated: "The basic aim of S. 989, as amended, is
to assure that Federal grand and petit jurors are drawn at random from a representative cross
section of the community and that all qualified citizens have an opportunity to be considered
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remain faithful to the language and spirit of Thiel and should recog-
nize all significant community social groups as cognizable.
To recapitulate Part I, the right to a representative jury chosen
from a fair cross section of the community is based on a variety of
sources, both constitutional and statutory. By analyzing the underly-
ing purposes of the cross-sectional right, courts have identified a
number of interests which it protects. These include the interest of
criminal defendants and other litigants in a fair trial free from bias,
the interests of members of all identifiable groups in equal participa-
tion in the administration of justice, and the interest of society as a
whole in ensuring that disputes are resolved fairly.
Courts have treated cognizability quite differently over the years.
After the initial cognizability finding in Strauder v. West Virginia,
137
the courts did not discuss the issue again until the 1940s. The expan-
sive treatment of cognizability during that era appeared to end with
Hernandez v. Texas.' 38 Since then, courts often have been unwilling
either to recognize formerly recognized groups or to expand the lim-
its of groups considered cognizable. Factors underlying this unwill-
ingness may include the courts' desire to limit the effects of the prima
facie case doctrine, the courts' inability to use the equal protection
clause with precision and flexibility, and the courts' failure to appre-
ciate the differences and scope of the sources of the cross-sectional
right.
II. COGNIZABILITY AS APPLIED TO YOUNG ADULTS
Challenges to the underrepresentation of the young on juries pro-
liferated in the late 1960s and have not abated during the 1970s.
They have been largely unsuccessful. In some instances, complain-
ants conceded at the outset that jury officials did not intentionally
discriminate on the basis of age, and thus their claims failed.1
39
Challenges to the periodic emptying and refilling of the jury wheel in
federal districts at specified intervals of four years or less' 40 also have
been rejected, despite the inevitable, progressive exclusion of those
for Federal jury service." 114 CONG. REC. 3990 (1968). The Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary stressed that "[a] jury chosen from a representative community sample is a fundamental of
our system of justice." S. REP. No. 891, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967).
137. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
138. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
139. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1335 (2d Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 424
U.S. 947 (1976); United States v. DiTommaso, 405 F.2d 385, 387 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 934 (1969). See text at note 13 supra.
140. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(4) (1976).
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aged 18-21 during each four-year cycle.' 4 ' Moreover, the use of
source lists on which the young are underrepresented has generally
been upheld. 142 However, most challenges to the exclusion of young
adults from juries have failed because courts refused to consider
them cognizable. Like the recent cases concerning occupational, in-
come, and educational groups, these decisions have emphasized
problems of group definition and the failure of complainants to
prove that young adults share a distinct perspective which cannot be
represented adequately by others.
Fortunately, not all courts have denied the cognizability of the
young. In People v. Bartlett, 43 the court assumed without discussion
that young adults are a sufficiently large and identifiable group to be
entitled to protection from discrimination, and it condemned jury
selection practices which caused a gross underrepresentation of per-
sons aged eighteen to twenty-nine on petit jury panels. 144 Similarly,
in People v. Attica Brothers, 45 the court assumed that students are
cognizable and ordered officials to revise the jury pool upon proof
that students had been systematically and intentionally excluded
from jury duty. 146 Other courts have recognized the cognizability of
the young even more explicitly. The principal case is United States v.
Butera. 47 In holding that young adults aged twenty-one to thirty-
four are cognizable, the court stated:
[W]e [cannot] close our eyes to the contemporary national preoccupa-
tion with a "generation gap," which creates the impression that the
attitudes of young adults are in some sense distinct from those of older
adults. That apparent distinctness is sufficient for us to say that neither
class could be excluded from jury pools without some justification.14
8
Another court, citing Butera, also found young adults cognizable
141. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), approved the federal scheme on the
ground that "some play in the joints of the jury-selection process is necessary in order to ac-
commodate the practical problems of judicial administration." 418 U.S. at 138. See also
United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771, 780-81 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976);
United States v. Ware, 473 F.2d 530, 537 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213,
1218 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973); Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141,
145 (7th Cir. 1972).
142. See note 8 supra.
143. 89 Misc. 2d 874, 393 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
144. 89 Misc. 2d at 881-83, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 871-72.
145. 79 Misc. 2d 492, 359 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
146. 79 Misc. 2d at 495,359 N.Y.S.2d at 704. However, the court was more doubtful about
the cognizability of young people. Without reaching the issue, the court ruled against com-
plainants because they failed to prove intentional discrimination against the young. 79 Misc.
2d at 495, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
147. 420 F.2d 564 (Ist Cir. 1970).
148. 420 F.2d at 570. Defendant's claim ultimately was rejected, however, because the
court found that the key-man system under attack was reasonably designed to obtain a fair
cross section for the jury pools in southern Maine, and that it was administered "without dis-
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and condemned automatic exemption of students because it caused
substantial underrepresentation of young people on the jury rolls. 1
49
Courts refusing to recognize young adults generally rely on the
failure of the group to satisfy one or more of the cognizability crite-
ria articulated in United States v. Guzman:
A group to be "cognizable" for present purposes must have a defi-
nite composition. That is, there must be some factor which defines and
limits the group. A cognizable group is not one whose membership
shifts from day to day or whose members can be arbitrarily selected.
Secondly, the group must have cohesion. There must be a common
thread which runs through the group, a basic similarity in attitudes or
ideas or experience which is present in members of the group and
which cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from
the jury selection process. Finally, there must be a possibility that ex-
clusion of the group will result in partiality or bias on the part ofjuries
hearing cases in which group members are involved. That is, the group
must have a community of interest which cannot be adequately pro-
tected by the rest of the populace.
150
Thus, United States v. Ross15' reasoned that the refusal to hold
the young cognizable was "justified in light of the fact that the pa-
rameters of such a group are difficult to ascertain, as evidenced by
the widely varying ages which have been used to define it.' 1"52 Some
courts have declined to recognize age groups spanning only a few
years because it was not shown that persons in the designated groups
share distinct views. In United States v. Kuhn, 153 for example, de-
fendant challenged the systematic exclusion of persons aged twenty-
one to twenty-three from jury service. The Court held: "There is
nothing identifiable or distinctive about young adults in the age
range of 21 to 23 to set them apart from young adults aged 23 and
cernible discrimination against any group." 420 F.2d at 574. The court thus concluded that
the government had rebutted the defendant's prima facie case. 420 F.2d at 574 n.24.
149. People v. Marr, 67 Misc. 2d 113, 117, 324 N.Y.S.2d 608, 613 (Just. Ct. 1971). Seealso
People v. Fujita, 43 Cal. App. 3d 454, 475-76, 117 Cal. Rptr. 757, 770 (1974); Julian v. State,
135 Ga. App. 592, 215 S.E.2d 496 (1975); Paciona v. Marshall, 45 App. Div. 2d 462, 359
N.Y.S.2d 360, ajd., 35 N.Y.2d 289, 319 N.E.2d 199, 360 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1974); State v. Hol-
strom, 43 Wis. 2d 465, 470-73, 168 N.W.2d 574, 578 (1969).
150. 337 F. Supp. 140, 143-44 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 937 (1973). Employing these criteria, the court found that none of the groups de-
scribed by complainants-18- to 21-year-olds, 24- to 30-year-olds, and "younger persons" in
general-were cognizable. 337 F. Supp. at 145.46.
151. 468 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1972), cerl. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973).
152. 468 F.2d at 1217. See also Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141, 144 (7th Cir. 1972);
Quadra v. Superior Court, 378 F. Supp. 605, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1974); United States v. Guzman,
337 F. Supp. 140, 146 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937
(1973).
153. 441 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1971).
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over who were eligible for jury duty at the time in question."'' 54
Claims of discrimination against age groups spanning more years
have often been rejected for similar failures of proof. For example,
United States ex rel. Chestnut v. Criminal Court155 sustained grand
jury selection procedures that operated to exclude all people under
thirty-five because "[p]etitioners here have presented no factual data
of any sort, tentative or otherwise, to support their suspicion of parti-
ality" against defendants. 56 The Court also found "no apparent
ground for assuming that a grand jury deficient in the various under-
represented groups would be unduly sympathetic to the prosecu-
tor." 157 Similarly, the court in Quadra v. Superior Court declined to
follow Butera in taking judicial notice of cognizability; it dismissed a
claim on behalf of young adults aged twenty-one to forty because
plaintiffs offered no proof that the group was distinct and identifi-
able. 5  Finally, many courts denying the cognizability of the young
object that inevitably there are differences as well as similarities
among members of the group.'
59
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether young adults are
an identifiable group for jury selection purposes, 60 nor has the
154. 441 F.2d at 181. Similarly, United States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cer.
denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973), held that complainants failed to show that the attitudes of the 18-
to 20-year-old age group were inadequately represented by those several years older than they.
473 F.2d at 688. See also United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 1972), cer.
denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973); United States v. Allen, 445 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1971); King v.
United States, 346 F.2d 123 (1st Cir. 1965); United States v. Deardorff. 343 F. Supp. 1033, 1043
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 146 (S.D.N.Y.), afjd, 468 F.2d
1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973). United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (Ist
Cir. 1970), which held young adults aged 21-34 cognizable, often is distinguished in cases
reviewing two- to four-year age groups on the ground that the age group in Butera was much
larger and thus more stable and identifiable. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d at 1217
n.4.
155. 442 F.2d 611 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971).
156. 442 F.2d at 616 n.9.
157. 442 F.2d at 616.
158. 378 F. Supp. 605, 622-23 (N.D. Cal. 1974). See also United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d
1310, 1316-17 (D.C. Cir.), ceri. denied, 429 U.S. 852 (1976); United States v. Briggs, 366
F. Supp. 1356, 1362 (N.D. Fla. 1973); United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 145-46
(S.D.N.Y.), affd., 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cerl. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 944 (1974); United States v. Guzman, 468 F.2d 1245, 1247 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973); United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973).
160. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), assumed without reaching the issue that
the young are a cognizable group and found that the petitioners had failed to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination against young adults aged 18-24. 418 U.S. at 135-38. The Court
did appear skeptical of their cognizability:
Petitioners do not cite case authority for the proposition that the young are an identifi-
able group entitled to a group-based protection under our prior cases, see [Hernandez];
claims of exclusion of the young from juries have met with little success in the federal
courts.
418 U.S. at 137 (citation and footnote omitted). And the Court seemed to assume that a pur-
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.Court defined precisely the general standards for determining
cognizability. The criteria of cognizability set forth in Guzman are
essentially those developed by the lower courts over the years. How-
ever, they should not be applied either uncritically or too stringently,
as some courts have done. The first criterion of Guzman, that a
group have a definite composition and not be arbitrarily defined, is
troublesome. Although the criterion has some validity, 161 in apply-
ing it courts often have ignored the fact that society must draw many
lines which are somewhat arbitrary. The second criterion, that the
group be cohesive and have basically similar attitudes, ideas, and
experiences, is more acceptable. However, this criterion should not
be misinterpreted as requiring complete uniformity within the
group. 62 As several members of the Court reasoned in Peters v. KX7,
"It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will consis-
tently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion
deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have
unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented."'
163
The third criterion states as a requirement that exclusion of the
group might cause juries to be biased against a defendant from that
group. This is a sufficient but not necessary condition of
cognizability, for the Supreme Court has clearly held that defendants
who do not belong to a group nonetheless have standing to object to
its exclusion from the jury under both the sixth amendment' 64 and
the equal protection clause. 65 Moreover, this criterion and the sec-
poseful discrimination against the young must be shown. 418 U.S. at 137. However, the opin-
ion offers only a very cursory discussion of the age-discrimination claim; the predominant
issue before the sharply divided Court was the constitutional validity of an obscenity prosecu-
tion.
Earlier in the same term that Hamling was decided, several members of the Court were in
favor of hearing a defendant's contention that women and young adults aged 18-30 were sys-
tematically and purposefully excluded from grand and petit jury venires. The defendant had
asserted that proof of underrepresentation and of an opportunity to discriminate should estab-
lish a prima facie case, as in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), a racial discrimina-
tion case. The Justices responded:
Though Alexander involved racial discrimination, appellant's contention certainly
presents a substantial question whether the principles of that decision should apply where
any large, identifiable segment of the community is arbitrarily or discriminatonly under-
represented on the jury venire.
White v. Georgia, 414 U.S. 886, 890 (1973) (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting from dismissal of appeal).
161. See text at notes 169-71 infra.
162. Unfortunately, some courts have indicated at least partial agreement with such an
interpretation. See cases cited in note 159 supra.
163. 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and Stewart,
JJ.), approvingly noted in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532 n.12 (1975).
164. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975).
165. Peters v. Kifl, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
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ond criterion should not be applied conjunctively, as Guzman sug-
gests, but disjunctively. Either a finding that members of an age
group share common ideas or experiences which cannot be repre-
sented adequately in their absence or that possible partiality or bias
against a defendant if members of his age group are excluded war-
rant a designation of cognizability if the first criterion is also satis-
fied.
III. ESTABLISHING THE COGNIZABILITY OF YOUNG ADULTS16 6
As Part II has shown, problems of group definition and failure of
proof have been the two main obstacles to the cognizability of young
adults. The following discussion will demonstrate that these obsta-
cles can be surmounted. Although courts may be correct in refusing
to recognize age groups spanning only a few years, their refusal to
recognize larger age groups is unreasonable. Moreover, the courts'
unwillingness to assume that young adults have attitudes, ideas, and
experiences different from those of their elders and that young crimi-
nal defendants may be prejudiced by the absence of their peers on
juries can and should be overcome with proof of these facts.
A. Dqfining Young Adults
Administratively convenient definitions of "young adults" can be
written. It is easy to tell whether a person is a member of a group
aged eighteen to thirty, for example, because age itself both defines
and limits the group. Although the group's composition changes
with the passage of time, the change is slight from year to year, and
that gradual change is not significantly greater than the change in
racial or gender groups through disqualification from service, use of
exemptions, or movement into or out of a jurisdiction.
The boundaries of an age group are indeed somewhat arbitrary
and often could be altered slightly without noticeably changing the
group character. Society draws many lines by age which are some-
166. The discussion and data presented in the remainder of the Article strongly support the
conclusion that older age groups as well as younger age groups are cognizable. Federal law
and the laws of most states do not impose upper age limits on jury service, and persons over
age 65 apparently are substantially underrepresented on the jury rolls in most jurisdictions.
See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 35-39, 258-70 app. A, 332-47 app. H. The complete absence
of challenges to underrepresentation of the elderly probably stems from the fact that older
jurors are more conservative and tend to have a stronger law and order orientation than
younger jurors. Since criminal defendants bring most challenges to selection procedures,
challenges to the underrepresentation of the elderly probably seem counter-productive.
Underrepresentation of young adults is even greater than underrepresentation of the elderly in
most jurisdictions, J. VAN DYKE, rupra note 4, at 332 app. H, and the issue is approached here
from the perspective of the young.
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what arbitrary, however. It surely does not follow that we would be
better off drawing no line at all.167 Here, if it is clearly shown that
young adults generally have different attitudes from their elders, and
if the location of the boundary between them can be roughly indi-
cated, then it hardly seems sensible to deny the group's cognizability
simply because any boundary drawn in that range will be as rational
as any other. Such reasoning apparently persuaded the court in
Butera. While conceding that young adults were an "ill-defined"
group, the court stated: "We cannot allow the requirement of a 'dis-
tinct' group to be applied so stringently with regard to age grouping
that possible discrimination against a large class of persons-in our
case, those between twenty-one and thirty-four-will be insulated
from attack.'
68
At the root of judicial concern about group definition might be
the fear that if young adults are recognized as cognizable, age groups
with short time spans must also be recognized. 169 But that conclu-
sion does not follow from the premise. People perceive themselves,
and are perceived by others, as members of broad age categories-as
young adults, middle-aged, or elderly-not, for example, as twenty-
one to twenty-three year olds.170 An age group of only two or three
years span will differ little in attitude from a similarly narrow group
of the same span which is just older than the first, or just younger.
The kind of proof of attitude examined in the next section will sim-
ply not be available for groups spanning less than approximately ten
years. Consequently, the fear that recognizing young adults will
open the floodgates to challenges by narrow age groups is unwar-
ranted. 17
167. In Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), the Supreme
Court upheld a statute requiring that state police retire at age 50, despite the age limit's inevi-
table arbitrariness. The Court stated, "IT]he drawing of lines that create distinctions is...
unavoidable. . . . Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither possible nor
necessary." 427 U.S. at 314. Since physical fitness generally declines with age, the Court
found that the Massachusetts requirement was rationally related to the legitimate state objec-
tive of assuring the physical preparedness of its police officers. 427 U.S. at 314-15.
If courts endorse, as they must and do, somewhat arbitrary age limitations which impose
substantial hardships on persons in certain age groups, they should also be willing to endorse a
somewhat arbitrary definiion of young adults for jury selection purposes which imposes hard-
ships on no one.
168. 420 F.2d 564, 570 (1st Cir. 1970).
169. See cases cited in notes 153-54 supra.
170. See Part III. B infra.
171. Apparently similar to the problem of defining the contours of a cognizable age group
is the problem of determining the minimum age requirement for jury service. These issues are
distinct, however. As note 167 supra suggests, the first issue is whether the judiciary should
employ an inevitably arbitrary measure to protect constitutional rights; the second is whether




B. Age as a Determinant of Attitude
It has become a social scientists' truism that the young share
common and distinct attitudes. The social scientist's evidence speaks
to all the traditional criteria of cognizability. That evidence supple-
ments the above argument that "the young" are easily defined, and
the presence of common attitudes suggests that the young are "cohe-
sive." Finally, the evidence provides a basis for the inference that
the attitudes of the young differ sufficiently from those of the rest of
the population that excluding the young from juries would adversely
affect the quality of deliberation.
Age crucially influences people's thoughts and acts:
Age, in Manheim's insightful formulation, "locates" individuals in
the social structure. There is much evidence that, for example, a per-
son's activities, his attitudes toward life, his relationships to his family
or to his work-as well as his biological capacities and his physical
fitness-are all conditioned by his position in the age structure of the
particular society in which he lives. 17
2
Age differences in society are not random; they are patterned and
systematic. Indeed, "age operates as a basis of social stratification
much like class"1 73 and divides our society into three broad, post-
childhood segments: the young, middle-aged and aged. 174 In addi-
tion,
age orders both people and roles. Not only is the population ranked
according to age, but social roles, with their differing rewards, are de-
fined in terms of age and age-related criteria. The result is the forma-
Aside from this line-drawing problem, minimum age requirements might aplfear to under-
mine the thesis that the young are cognizable. If the very young can be excluded from jury
service entirely, why may not the state employ selection procedures which merely under-
represent those slightly older? Is it not a paradox that a state which gives 18- to 21-year-olds
the legal right to serve might be forbidden from systematically excluding them, even though
another state might be permitted to deny the same group the right to serve?
This paradox can be explained by an analogy to another important citizenship right, the
right to vote. Although a state might constitutionally deny the vote to 17-year-olds, it could
not grant them the vote conditionally by, for instance, imposing a poll tax. Similarly, once the
state has announced that a class of persons deserves to serve on juries, it cannot allow capri-
cious devices that effectively cancel their right to serve. Government integrity demands that
citizenship rights be granted fully or not at all.
In large part, the paradox is only of theoretical interest. Since the minimum age for jury
service probably could not be constitutionally raised much above the age of 21, and since the
age group 21-30 is sufficiently large and distinct to be cognizable, the underrepresentation of
young people can still be successfully challenged.
172. 3 M. RILEY, M. JOHNSON & A. FONER, AGING AND SOCIETY 398 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as AGING AND SOCIETY 19721. See also Foner, Age in Society. Structure and Change,
19 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 144, 148 (1975).
173. Foner, supra note 172, at 145; see 1 M. RILEY & A. FONER, AGING AND SOCIETY
(1968) [hereinafter cited as AGING AND SOCIETY 1968].
174. AGING AND SOCIETY 1968, supra note 173, at 2; AGING AND SOCIETY 1972, supra
note 172, at 420.
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tion of age strata distinguished from one another because their
members differ in age or life stage and in access to roles which are
unequally rewarded by wealth, prestige, or power.
175
Age stratification has become more important in our society. In
the nineteenth century,
the boundaries between age strata were not so clearly defined, and
there was a good deal more age heterogeneity in social life than there is
today. But in the modem period, with the great complexity of social
organizations and the high degree of bureaucratization, age has in-
creasingly become an important criterion for social differentiation and
inequality.
176
Today the differences associated with age are ubiquitous. Age
groups differ in "labor force participation, consumer behavior, lei-
sure-time activities, marital status, religious behavior, education, na-
tivity, fertility, child-rearing practices, political attitudes-to name
only a few."' 177 Moreover, "[o]lder people differ sharply from
younger people in many of their opinions, feelings, and dispositions
toward such central aspects of life as health, personal problems, or
death."' 78 The old also tend to be more politically conservative,
more resistant to change, and less tolerant of political and social
nonconformists than the young. 179 "It comes as no surprise, then,
that each age strata has its own distinctive subculture."'t80
An examination of the causes of age-group differences demon-
strates how and why those groups form recognizable social catego-
ries with fairly well-defined boundaries. First, at any given period
members of an age stratum belong to the same birth cohort, "[e]ach
cohort [having] unique characteristics because of the particular his-
torical events it has undergone, [and] the particular knowledge and
attitudes it has acquired in childhood .... ,,181 Cohesion in each co-
hort is fostered by a "homogeneity in values and beliefs (about what
is good, beautiful or true) among individuals who were educated at
175. Foner, supra note 172, at 147 (references omitted); see AGING AND SOCIETY 1968,
supra note 173, at 410-12.
176. Affidavit of Dr. Anne Foner at 15, Johnson v. Durante, No. 73C 1159-EN (E.D. N.Y.,
filed Aug. 3, 1973) (submitted as direct testimony). In that case, the systematic exclusion of
those aged 18-30 from grand jury service in Queens County, New York, Was challenged. See
also Neugarten & Hagestad, Age and the Life Course, in HANDBOOK OF AGING AND THE
SOCIAL SCIENces 35, 45, 52 (R. Binstock & E. Shanas eds. 1976).
177. AGING AND SOCIETY 1972, supra note 172, at 420.
178. AGING AND SOCIETY 1968, supra note 173, at 315. See also AGING AND SOCIETY
1972, supra note 172, at 431.
179. AGING AND SOCIETY 1968, supra note 173, at 5,473. See AGING AND SOCIETY 1972,
supra note 172, at 115-19, 132-34.
180. AGING AND SOCIETY 1972, supra note 172, at 420 (emphasis original).
181. AGING AND SOCIETY 1968, supra note 173, at 3. See also Foner, supra note 172, at
151; AGING AND SOCIETY 1972, supra note 172, at 4, 418-19, 432-33.
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the same point in history."' 182 Conversely, differences in life stage
and experience may engender hostility and conflict between age
strata.18
3
A second factor making for distinct age groups is the commonali-
ties of life stage shared.by group members.
Like persons within a class, individuals of similar age at any one pe-
riod have common opportunities to fill valued roles. They share the
joys and pains of current life tasks. Because they are at the same stage
of their life course, they resemble one another in biological develop-
ment and in the role sequences and role transitions they have exper-
ienced. 184
The extensive age segregation in the United States further pro-
motes solidarity between those of the same age and insulates mem-
bers of one group from members of another. Age segregation is
common in education, employment, and residency. Face-to-face
contact within age strata reinforces similar ideas and attitudes, while
often allowing members of one stratum to remain unaware of or un-
sympathetic to the ideas of other strata.185
The sociological findings on the importance of age in determin-
ing attitudes go to the essence of cognizability. The unique perspec-
tives and shared experiences of young adults simply cannot be
represented adequately by their elders. Because age groups differ in
varied and subtle ways, underrepresentation of the young on juries
inevitably diminishes the interplay of ideas and viewpoints during
deliberations. As when women are absent, "a flavor, a distinct quali-
ty is lost' 86 if young adults are seriously underrepresented on jury
rolls.
IV. ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN
JURY DELIBERATIONS
The evidence presented above permits the inference that the
young meet the third criterion of cognizability-that their attitudes
are so different from those of the rest of the population that the qual-
ity of a jury's deliberation would be significantly affected by the ab-
182. AGING AND SOCIETY 1968, supra note 173, at 5. See also Foner, supra note 172, at
151.
183. Waring & Riley, Age andAging, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 363 (4th ed.
R. Merton & R. Nisbet 1976). See also Foner, supra note 172, at 153-54; AGING AND SOCIETY
1972, supra note 172, at 145, 442-48.
184. Foner, supra note 172, at 150-51.
185. See generally Foner, supra note 172, at 151; Waring & Riley, supra note 183, at 377-
79.
186. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946).
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sence of the young. However, since the evidence is inferential only,
this Article presents the results of a survey which speaks directly to
the question whether excluding the young would affect the nature of
a jury's discussions and decisions. The results of this survey are es-
pecially significant in that such specific proof has apparently never
been presented in discussions of cognizability.
The survey was conducted in Queens County, New York. 187 It
reveals consistent and significant differences in attitudes among per-
sons in different age groups on matters crucial to jury deliberations.
The greatest disparities in attitudes are those between the youngest
(18-30) and oldest (61-75). The data also show that the correlations
between attitudes and age are much greater than the correlations be-
tween attitudes and race, sex, occupation, or income. Since racial
groups, women, and on occasion, occupational and income groups,
have been held cognizable, young adults are cognizable a fortiori.
A. Methodology' 88
The survey was specifically designed to elicit attitudes concerning
the workings of the criminal justice system and service on petit and
grand juries. The questionnaire contained twenty-one opinion state-
ments 89 and requested demographic information. Systematically
187. The results of the survey were submitted at trial in Johnson v. Durante, No. 73C
1159-EN (E.D.N.Y., ified Aug. 3, 1973), in support of the plaintiffs' challenge to the exclusion
of the young from grand jury service in that county.
For a comparison of the demographic characteristics of Queens County and the United
States as a whole, see Appendix D infra.
188. Appendix A infra describes in greater detail the methodology of the survey.
189. A copy of the full questionnaire may be found in Appendix A (Exhibit 1). The 21
opinion statements (numbered as on the questionnaire) are as follows:
1. It is better to let some guilty people go free rather than risk sending innocent people to
jail.
2. Police should not hesitate to use force to maintain order.
3. Capital punishment is more effective than a life sentence in keeping people from com-
mitting murder.
4. The courts allow young people to get away with too much too easily.
5. Police should be allowed to arrest and question suspicious looking persons to deter-
mine whether they have been up to something illegal.
6. A witness who takes the fifth amendment is probably hiding his or her guilt of a
crime.
7. Police will often lie to cover up for one another.
8. In tough situations older people almost always make wiser decisions than younger
people.
9. Young people have less respect for law than older people.
10. A person accused of several different crimes is probably guilty of at least one of
them.
I1. The police don't make arrests unless they have good reason to believe that a crime
has been committed.
12. Too often, the government brings people to trial who are not really guilty.
13. Obedience to authority is the most important virtue children should learn.
14. In &riminal cases the judge instructs the jury that the defendant must be considered
innocent unless proven guilty. However, many people think that a defendant has the
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chosen samples of those on the petit and grand jury rolls and of
members of the general public were contacted by telephone, and 579
interviews were completed. For all but three statements, respondents
were asked to tell the interviewer whether they agreed strongly,
agreed somewhat, disagreed somewhat, or disagreed strongly with
the statement read to them. For convenience, the "agree strongly"
and "agree somewhat" responses are combined in the presentation
below. 190 Three statistical procedures were used to analyze the sur-
vey data: tables of percentages, Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficients, and standardized multiple regression coefficients. Each
is explained in context.
B. The Findings
1. The Relationship Between Age and Attitudes
The survey results demonstrate significant correlations between
age and attitudes among the groups sampled.' 9' Since space con-
straints prohibit a discussion of all twenty-one statements, only six
statements are discussed. However, the responses are representative
of the responses by age for all twenty-one statements.' 92
Statement 6 was: "A witness who takes thefifth amendment isprob-
responsibility to prove his or her innocence. If you were a member of a jury in a criminal
case, would you follow the judge's instructions or would you want the defendant to prove
innocence?
15. If you were a member of a jury in a criminal case and truly believed that the person
on trial was guilty but the evidence didn't prove it, would you vote to find the person
guilty or not guilty?
19. If a District Attorney strongly recommends an indictment grand jurors should go
along with the recommendation.
20. Grand jurors rarely need to exercise their right to ask questions of witnesses because
they can rely on the District Attorney to ask all necessary questions.
21. During deliberations, if one grand juror disagrees with the rest of the jurors that
person should change his or her vote to go along with the majority.
22. Since the District Attorney is more familiar with the evidence, the grand jury should
always follow his recommendations.
23. District Attorneys sometimes conceal evidence from a grand jury in order to get an
indictment. '
24. Do you think Society would be better served if the grand jury represented all seg-
ments of the community or if it was composed of older, more experienced people?
Questions 16 through 18 are omitted here and in the analysis of results because they were
designed to probe the respondent's understanding of a grand jury, not to elicit an opinion.
190. The percentage disagreeing with the statement in each group may be determined by
subtracting the percentage listed in the tables from 100%.
191. Of the three groups sampled, 10% of the general public had served on a petit jury, 58%
of those from the petit jury pool had served on a petit jury, and 60% of those from the grand
jury pool had served on a grand jury. Data runs were conducted controlling for the fact of
service as to all 21 opinion statements. The results showed virtually no differences in opinion
between those who had served and those who had not served on juries. Thus, it can be inferred
that jury service does little to modify one's attitudes, at least as to the issues probed in this
survey.
192. Appendix C infra gives a complete set of percentage tabulations for all the demo-
graphic variables-age, race, sex, occupation, and income.
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ably hiding his or her guilt of a crime." Table 1 shows the percentage
agreeing with this statement by age and sample.
193
TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH STATEMENT 6 BY AGE
Statement 6: "A witness who takes the fifth amendment is probably hiding his or her
guilt of a crime."
Age
Level of
Sample 18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 % Diff.19 4  Significance
General Public 39 59 64 74 +35 .01
Petit Jurors 33 50 52 80 +47 .001
Grand Jurors 12 13 38 84 +72 .001
In all three samples, younger people agreed with Statement 6
much less frequently than older people. Moreover, there is a clear
trend in each sample of increasing agreement from the youngest to
the oldest age groups. And in all three samples, the difference in
attitude is greatest between the youngest and the oldest groups. In
the grand juror sample, the difference is an unusually large seventy-
two percent. The responses to Statement 6 suggest that if young
adults are absent from jury rolls, the right to invoke the fifth amend-
ment may not be fully recognized.
The ninth statement read to those surveyed was: "Young people
have less respect for law than older people." Table 2 shows the per-
centages agreeing with this statement in each age group in the three
samples.
The data in Table 2 show the same general patterns as the data in
Table 1. Older people agreed with the statement much more fre-
quently than younger people, and there is a clear trend in each sam-
ple of increasing agreement from the youngest to the oldest groups.
Further, in the general public and petit juror samples, the difference
in attitude is greatest between the youngest and the oldest.
193. On the average for all statements, less than 5% of those surveyed were unable or
unwilling to give an opinion. This low rate indicates that the statements were meaningful and
clear to those surveyed.
194. The percentage differences listed are the differences between the left-most and right-
most categories of the social characteristic. The level of significance is .01 for the general
public sample, using the chi-square (x
2) test. This indicates that there is only one chance in
one hundred that the observed relationship (+35% difference) could have occurred in the sam-
ple solely as a result of sampling error (Le., without the relationship existing in the population
from which the sample was drawn). Note that lower levels of significance are better, Le.,
indicate lower probabilities of sampling error. Stronger relationships (higher percent differ-
ences) and larger sample sizes each contribute to statistical significance and to greater sample
reliability. For a discussion of chi-square and other tests of statistical significance, see W.




PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH STATEMENT 9 BY AGE
Statement 9: "Young people have less respect for law than older people."
Age
Level-of
Sample 18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 % Diff. Significance
General Public 48 62 63 90 +42 .01
Petit Jurors 42 63 80 80 +38 .001
Grand Jurors 38 37 55 86 +48 .01
In addition to Statement 9, Statements 4, 8, and 24 raise issues
dealing explicitly with age. The responses are only slightly less strik-
ing than those recorded for Statement 9.195 These results suggest an
underlying pattern of hostility toward the young among older peo-
ple, some of whom might presume that young people accused of
crime are ipso facto guilty. Thus, a jury on which young adults are
underrepresented might be less likely to accord a young defendant
the full presumption of innocence. 196 Because most persons accused
of crime are under thirty, 197 the nearly universal underrepresentation
of the youngest age group on jury rolls poses a danger of age bias in
most criminal cases.
The tenth statement read: "A person accused of several dfferent
crimes isprobably guilty of at least one of them." Table 3 shows the
percentages of people who agreed with this statement in each age
group in the three samples.
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH STATEMENT 10 BY AGE
Statement 10: "A person accused of several different crimes is probably guilty of at
least one of them."
Age
Level of
Sample 18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 % Diff. Significance
General Public 53 44 63 83 +30 .01
Petit Jurors 38 54 60 77 +39 .05
Grand Jurors 41 28 37 66 +25 .05
195. See Appendix C infra.
196. Statement 14, printed in note 189 supra, explicitly probes attitudes toward the pre-
sumption of innocence. Although the responses are less striking than the responses to State-
ments 4, 8, 9, and 24, see Appendix C infra, they are consistent with the conclusion that the
underrepresentation of young adults might result injuries which undervalue that presumption.
197. In 1974, for example, 27.2% of all the persons arrested in the United States were under
age 18, and 41.6% were between the ages of 18 and 29. Persons over age 30, by contrast,
constituted only 31% of those arrested. M. HINDELANG, M. GOTrFREDSON, C. DUNN & N.
PARISI, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1976, at 528-29 table 4.4 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS].
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In general, older people agreed with this statement much more
often than younger people. In this instance, however, the results do
not show a consistent trend of increasing agreement from the young-
est to the oldest groups in the general public and grand juror sam-
ples. As in the previous examples, however, the differences in
attitude between the youngest and the oldest age groups are great.
In the sample of the general public, thirty percent more of those in
the sixty-one to seventy-five age group agreed with the statement
than those in the eighteen to thirty age group, and the differences
between these age groups in the petit juror and grand juror samples
were thirty-nine and twenty-five percentage points respectively.
The first statement was: "It is better to let some guilty people go
free rather than risk sending innocent people to jail." Table 4 shows
the percentage in each group in each sample who disagreed1 98 with
this statement.
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE DISAGREEING WITH STATEMENT 1 BY AGE
Statement 1: "It is better to let some guilty people go free rather than risk sending
innocent people to jail."
Age
Level of
Sample 18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 % Diff. Significance
General Public 48 38 48 64 +16 .20
Petit Jurors 49 55 45 62 +13 Not Sig.
Grand Jurors 44 36 36 42 - 2 Not Sig.
Statement 1 is one of a few of the twenty-one opinion statements
for which there is not a clear and striking relationship between age
and attitude.' 99 In the general public and petit juror samples, older
people were somewhat more likely than younger people to disagree
and, once again, the greatest differences were between the youngest
(or next youngest) and oldest age groups. However, there is not a
consistent trend of increasing disagreement from the youngest to the
198. Statement 1 was one of four statements which were phrased in a "liberal" rather than
a "conservative" manner. The other "liberal" statements are 7, 12, and 23. See note 189
supra. Generally, the responses to these items tended to be the opposite of the responses to the
statements phrased conservatively; that is, younger people more often agreed and older people
more often disagreed with these statements. Percentages for those who disagreed with the
statements are listed to make the complete set of percentages tabulated in Appendix C more
readable.
199. Other statements for which the relationship between age and attitude is rather weak
are Statements 7 and 12, printed in note 189 supra. A stronger but still less than striking rela-
tionship is exhibited for Statements 14, 15, 19, and 23, printed in note 189 supra.
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oldest groups. Moreover, in the grand juror sample, the maximum
difference between any two age groups was only eight percent.
Questionnaire statements 19-24 were designed to elicit attitudes
toward grand jury matters directly. For example, Statement 21 was:
"During deliberations, f one grand juror disagrees with the rest of the
jurors, that person should change his or her vote to go along with the
majority." Table 5 shows the percentages who agreed with the state-
ment in each age group and sample.
TABLE 5
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH STATEMENT 21 BY AGE
Statement 21: "During deliberations, if one grand juror disagrees with the rest of the
jurors, that person should change his or her vote to go along with the majority."
Age
Level of
Sample 18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 % Diff. Significance
General Public 7 7 8 33 +26 .01
Petit Jurors 2 9 13 18 +16 .15
Grand Jurors 0 0 3 25 +25 .01
A clear relationship between age and attitude is exhibited by the
responses in all three samples-ie., older people agreed with the
statement more often than younger people. Furthermore, there is a
clear trend of increasing agreement from the youngest to the oldest
groups in all samples. The responses of those in the oldest age group
were markedly different from the responses of those in the other age
groups.
The responses to Statement 22 were very similar to the responses
to Statement 21. Statement 22 was: "Since the District Attorney is
morefamiliar with the evidence, the grandjury should alwaysfollow his
recommendations." The percentages agreeing by age and sample are
listed in Table 6.
TABLE 6
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH STATEMENT 22 BY AGE
Statement 22: "Since the District Attorney is more familiar with the evidence, the
grand jury should always follow his recommendations."
Age
Level of
Sample 18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 % Diff. Significance
General Public 13 18 28 66 +53 .001
Petit Jurors 10 9 20 37 +27 .001
.Grand Jurors 6 0 9 28 +22 .10
Once again, older people agreed with the statement much more
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often than younger people. The pattern of increasing agreement by
age is repeated for the most part. Finally, the differences in attitude
in each sample between the youngest and oldest groups were large.
In the general public sample, the difference in response between
these groups was a substantial fifty-three percentage points.
The responses to Statements 21 and 22, as well as the responses
to the other statements concerning grand jury service,200 suggest that
people between the ages of eighteen and thirty are more likely to be
inclined to exercise independent judgment than are older people, es-
pecially those between the ages of sixty-one and seventy-five. Grand
juries on which young adults are substantially underrepresented thus
may be much more inclined to act as a rubber stamp for the prosecu-
tor than grand juries on which the young are properly represented.
In sum, these data documenting the relationship between age and
attitude on matters of importance in jury deliberations support the
conclusion that young adults are cognizable. The data show clear
and consistent differences of opinion by age on such matters as the
inference of guilt from silence, the presumption of innocence, the
predisposition of the young to break the law, the performance and
prerogatives of the police,201 and the role of the grand juror vis-k-vis
the district attorney. These results go to the heart of cognizability.
They demonstrate that the young have cohesive, distinct attitudes on
issues directly relevant to a jury's deliberations. Furthermore, they
demonstrate that permitting underrepresentation of the young on ju-
ries would be especially unfortunate, since the attitudes of the young
tend to be more congruent than those of the old with the values
which inform our legal system. Thus underrepresentation of the
young increases the risk of several kinds of jury bias, especially bias
against young criminal defendants.
20 2
200. See Appendix C infra, Statements 19-24.
201. In addition to Statement 10, discussedin text following note 197 supra, see Statements
2, 5, 7, and ll,printed in note 189 supra.
202. Other data are consistent with those presented above. The responses to the questions
concerning criminal justice issues presented in SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, supra note 197, show a significant relationship between age and attitude. Perceptions of
personal safety differ according to age. Fifty-two percent of those aged 20-24 said they felt
"very" safe about being out alone in their neighborhood during the day, while only 41% of
those aged 50-64 and only 31% of those above age 65 said they felt "very" safe. Id. at 304 table
2.8. Correspondingly, younger people are less likely than older people to think law enforce-
ment agencies should be tougher than they are now in dealing with crime and lawlessness.
Only 66% of the persons aged 18-20 favored tougher enforcement, while 85% of those aged 50
and over held that opinion. Id. at 316 table 2.29. Older people were more likely to favor the
death penalty and less likely to favor legalization of marijuana than younger people. Id. at
327 table 2.61, 342 table 2.91.
A similar relationship between age and attitude concerning criminal justice issues was
found in a Detroit Free Press survey of 500 jurors in 1970. Oppedalhl, The Generational Gap in
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2. Comparison of the Correlations Between Attitudes and Age with
the Correlations Between Attitudes and Race, Sex,
Occupation, and Income
The survey results provide important additional support for the
cognizability of the young, since they reveal that the correlations be-
tween attitudes and age are stronger than the correlations between
attitudes and race, sex, occupation, or income.
a. Correlation analysis. The percentage table method of analy-
sis used in the discussion of age and attitudes is too unwieldy to use
in analyzing all the demographic variables. Instead, Pearson prod-
uct-moment correlation coefficients are used.20 3 Five tables of per-
centages and a corresponding table of correlations are presented for
one opinion statement so that the reader may understand fully the
manner in which correlation coefficients summarize the data.
The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, symbolized
by r, summarizes the relationship between two variables (e.g., age
and attitude) in a single number. This coefficient ranges from -1.0
to +1.0. The sign of the coefficient indicates the nature of the rela-
tionship between the social characteristic and the opinion statement.
In the context of this survey, positive correlations mean that older
people, nonwhites, females, persons with higher occupational status,
and persons with higher incomes more often agree with the state-
ment. If the sign is negative, younger people, whites, males, persons
with lower occupational status, and persons with lower incomes
more often agree with the statement. The closer r is to 1.0, whether
positive or negative, the stronger the relationship between the demo-
graphic variable and the attitude. A large r thus corresponds to a
large difference in percentages. 2°4 If the value of r is zero or close to
zero, there is little or no consistent relationship between the demo-
graphic variable and the attitude, corresponding to little or no differ-
ence in the percentages.
Court, Detroit Free Press, July 26, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 2. The results of the survey are
presented in part in J. VAN DYKE, supra note 4, at 37-38. See also Ginger & Powers, Missis.
siopi Juror Age Requirement-Unfair to the Defendant, Unfair to the Young, and Unfair to the
Public-Is It Constitutional?, 47 MIss. L.J. 1 (1976).
203. For an explanation of this statistical technique, see H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICs
285-99 (1960).
204. The value of r does not correspond only to the percentage difference between the
extreme categories of the demographic variable (here, young adults vs. the aged), it accounts
for the percentage differences between all categories, including intermediate ones (here, those
aged 31-45 and 46-60). One mark of the sophistication of correlation analysis is this ability to
explain a statistical trend along an entire spectrum of categories. For an illustration, see text at
note 206 infra.
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The percentages of people in each of the three samples who
agreed with Statement 6 ("A witness who takes the fifth amendment is
probably hiding his or her guilt of a crime.") by age, race, sex, occupa-
tion and income are shown in Table 7. The correlation coefficients
summarizing these data are shown in part F of Table 7.
TABLE 7
PERCENTAGE AGREEING WITH STATEMENT 6 BY AGE, RACE, SEX,
OCCUPATION AND INCOME, AND CORRESPONDING CORRELATION
COEFFICIENTS
Statement 6: "A witness who takes the fifth amendment is probably hiding his or her
guilt of a crime."
A. Age
Level of
Sample 18-30 31-45 46-60 61-75 % Diff. Signigicance
General Public 39 59 64 74 +35 .01
Petit Jurors 33 50 52 80 +47 .001
Grand Jurors 12 13 38 84 +72 .001
B. Race
Level of
Sample White Nonwhite % Diff. Significance
General Public 58 58 0 Not Sig.
Petit Jurors 56 54 - 2 Not Sig.
Grand Jurors 55 66 +11 .10
C. Sex
Level of
Sample Male Female % Diff. Significance
General Public 54 62 + 8 Not Sig.
Petit Jurors 57 58 + I Not Sig.
Grand Jurors 54 63 + 9 Not Sig.
D. Occupation
0 -
cd S~4 d )
6 2 r..o Level of
Sample % Diff. Significance
General Public 58 64 75 48 56 82 57 - 1 .20
Petit Jurors 78 64 54 63 65 39 48 -30 Not Sig.




Under $5000- $10000- $15000- $20000- Over Level of
Sample $5000 $10000 $15000 $20000 $25000 $25000 % Diff. Significance
General Public 59 72 40 75 66 41 -18 .01
Petit Jurors 82 76 58 39 52 49 -33 .05
Grand Jurors 86 79 71 34 49 27 -59 .02
F. Correlation Coefficients 20 5
Nonwhite Female
Sample Age Race Sex Occupation Income
General Public .30 .00 .05 -. 09 -. 05
Petit Jurors .30 -. 04 .00 -. 14 -. 26
Grand Jurors .55 .10 .07 -. 37 -. 44
The figures for age show large differences of opinion between
younger and older people in all three groups sampled, especially in
the sample of grand jurors. The correlation table shows that the cor-
responding correlation coefficients for age are also large and positive
(.30, .30 and .55 for the general public, petit juror and grand juror
samples respectively). The percentages for race and sex show small
differences. The corresponding correlation coefficients for race and
sex are therefore also small. The greatest difference in attitude by
race or sex occurs between whites and nonwhites in the grand juror
sample, where eleven percent more nonwhites than whites agreed
with the statement. Similarly, the largest correlation, .10, appears for
the nonwhite race variable in the grand juror sample. (The negative
sign preceding the correlation coefficient of -. 04 for the nonwhite-
race variable in the petit juror sample indicates that in that sample,
as opposed to the other nonwhite samples, fewer nonwhites than
whites agreed with Statement 6.)
The percentage figures for occupation and income show that
205. In this context, positive correlations mean that older people agree more than younger
people, nonwhites more than whites, females more than males, higher-occupational-status per-
sons more than lower-occupational-status persons, and high-income persons more than low-
income persons. Negative correlations mean the opposite.
Correlations or regression coefficients must be approximately .15 to be significant at the .05
level in the general public and petit juror samples. In the smaller grand juror sample, correla-
tions must be about .20 to be significant at the .05 level.
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these two variables are more strongly related to attitude than are
race and sex. For example, in the grand juror sample, all of the op-
eratives and laborers agreed with Statement 6, while only thirty-four
percent of the professional and technical workers agreed. It is some-
what difficult to interpret these data, however, because income and
occupation have somewhat inconsistent effects and because each of
these two social characteristics has a large number of categories.
20 6
Correlation coefficients therefore are particularly useful in summa-
rizing these data. The correlation coefficients for occupation and in-
come are all negative, indicating that persons of lower occupational
status and lower income agreed more often than persons of higher
occupational status and higher income. The correlation coefficients
for occupation and income also vary considerably among the three
samples. They are negligible in the general public sample, moderate
in the petit juror sample, and strong in the grand juror sample.
Viewing the correlation coefficients as a whole, it is clear that age
correlates more strongly and consistently with attitudes than do any
of the other variables.
Table 8 shows the correlation coefficients for all five variables
and all twenty-one opinion statements for each of the three samples.
The brief phrases included in the table summarize the original state-
ments. Most of the opinion statements were phrased in a "conserva-
tive" manner; the exceptions are numbers 1, 7, 12, and 23, which are
identified by footnote "a" in the table. The negative correlation
coefficients of age for these four statements are explained by the fact
that older people generally agreed with them less often than younger
people.
Table 8 is divided into three sections: (A) general public, (B) petit
jurors, and (C) grand jurors. The largest correlation coefficient for
each statement is starred in order to highlight the relative impor-
tance of each of the five variables. In the sample of the general pub-
lic, age correlates most strongly with twelve of the twenty-one
opinion statements. Income correlates most strongly with three
statements, race, sex, and occupation with two statements each.
Thus, in this sample, attitudes correlate much more strongly with age
than with any other variable.
206. A good example of the inconsistency of these effects occurs in the general public sam-
ple for the occupational variable. Although the percentage difference listed is -1%, the differ-
ence is -27% if craftsmen and foremen (75%) are compared with clerical workers (48%), and
the difference is +24% if service workers (58%) are compared with managers and administra-
tors (82%).
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TABLE 8
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FIVE SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND
TWENTY-ONE OPINION STATEMENTS IN SAMPLES OF THE GEN-





Better to let guilty go free a
Police should use force
Capital punishment effective
Courts too easy on young
Police should arrest suspicious
Taking fifth amendment is
hiding
Police often lie for one
anothera
Older people wiser
Young respect law less
Several charges, guilty of one
Police arrest with good reason





Vote guilty despite lack of
evidenceb
Follow DA on indictment
Waive right and let DA ask
questions
Change vote to go with
majority
Follow DA since he knows
evidence
DAs conceal evidence for
indictmenta


































































-. 22 -. 13
-- continued-
* Highest correlation coefficient for each statement is starred.
a. These statements were phrased in a "liberal" manner.
b. For statements 14, 15, and 24, where only two choices were given, the correlation
was computed for picking the answer indicated.
Section B of Table 8 shows the same general pattern for the petit
jurors. Age correlates most strongly with nine of the twenty-one
opinion statements, while income "correlates most strongly with five.
Race, sex, and occupation show the strongest correlations with only
four, one, and two statements, respectively.
207
Section C of Table 8 presents the correlation coefficients for
grand jurors. Income emerges as the characteristic correlating most
207. Age is starred for Statement 20 in the petit jury sample as having the highest correla-
tion (.28) even though income has a correlation of apparently equal strength (-.28), because
age had a slightly stronger correlation before rounding.
Occu-
pation Income
.06 -.17* -. 08
.23* -. 11 -. 20
.12 -. 24 -. 30*
.13 -. 09 -. 20
.18 -. 24 -. 31
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B. Petit Jurors
Opinion Statements
1. Better to let guilty go freea
2. Police should use force
3. Capital punishment effective
4. Courts too easy on young
5. Police should arrest suspicious
6. Taking fifth amendment is
hiding
7. Police often lie for one
anothera
8. Older people wiser
9. Young respect law less
10. Several charges, guilty of one
11. Police arrest with good reason
12. Innocent are often trieda
13. Obedience to authority impor-
tant
14. Defendant must prove
innocenceb
15. Vote guilty despite lack of
evidenceb
19. Follow DA on indictment
20. Waive right and let DA ask
questions
S21. Change vote to go with
majority
22. Follow DA since he knows
evidence
23. DAs conceal evidence for
indictmenta















































































.06 -. 08 -. 10 -.12* -. 11













-. 16 -. 18
-continued-
S Highest correlation coefficient for each statement is starred.
a. These statements were phrased in a "liberal" manner.
b. For statements 14, 15, and 24, where only two choices were given, the correlation
was computed for picking the answer indicated.
strongly with 10 of the statements. Age correlates most strongly with
seven statements, while race, sex, and occupation show the strongest
correlations with three, none and one statements respectively. Over-
all, Table 8 demonstrates that attitudes correlate more strongly with
age than with any of the other variables tested.
b. Multiple regression analysis. The correlation analysis pro-
vides evidence that age is a more important determinant of these
opinions than the other social characteristics. However, correlation
analysis is not conclusive, because it considers only two variables at
a time (one social characteristic in relation to one opinion state-
ment). The final step of a thorough analysis requires a statistical
technique capable of analyzing several variables at a time, that is, a
technique which can examine the relationships of all the social char-





1. Better to let guilty go freea
2. Police should use force
3. Capital punishment effective
4. Courts too easy on young
5. Police should arrest suspicious
6. Taking fifth amendment is
hiding
7. Police often lie for one
anothera
8. Older people wiser
9. Young respect law less
10. Several charges, guilty of one
11. Police arrest with good reason
12. Innocent are often trieda
13. Obedience to authority impor-
tant
14. Defendant must prove
innocenceb
15. Vote guilty despite lack of
evidenceb
19. Follow DA on indictment
20. Waive right and let DA ask
questions
21. Change vote to go with
majority
22. Follow DA since he knows
evidence
23. DAs conceal evidence for
indictmenta































































-.03 .22* .03 -. 10 -. 02
.33* .13 -. 09 -. 11 -. 23
* Highest correlation coefficient for each statement is starred.
a. These statements were phrased in a "liberal" manner.
b. For statements 14, 15, and 24, where only two choices were given, the correlatiofi
was computed for picking the answer indicated.
The need for a multivariate analysis can be shown by a simple
example. The correlations have shown that occupational status and
family income generally are negatively correlated with the conserva-
tively phrased opinion statements: that is, persons with higher-status
occupations less often agree with such statements than persons with
lower-status occupations, and higher-income persons less often agree
than lower-income persons. However, occupational status is itself
positively correlated with income-persons with higher occupational
status generally have higher incomes than persons with lower occu-
pational status. 208 Therefore, the fact that persons of higher occupa-
tional status less often agree with these statements may be due either
to their higher occupational status, or to their higher income, or to
208. For the sample of the Queens County general public, the correlation between occupa-
tion and income was computed to be .23. The correlations were even higher for the petit juror
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both factors. A two-variable technique like correlation analysis can-
not distinguish that part of a correlation between a social character-
istic and an opinion statement which is actually due to the
characteristic, and that part which is due to the other social charac-
teristics with which the first characteristic is correlated. Only a mul-
tivariate technique can identify the independent effects of each social
characteristic on the opinions expressed in the survey.
Of the several different multivariate techniques, multiple regres-
sion analysis is considered the most widely applicable and statisti-
cally efficient.209 A multiple regression analysis therefore was
performed for each of the twenty-one opinion statements using the
regression routine in the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences.210 Multiple regression analysis has both similarities to and
differences from correlation analysis. Like correlation analysis, mul-
tiple regression analysis produces a single number, called a standard-
ized regression coefficient, for each of the social characteristics in
relation to an opinion statement. Regression coefficients, like corre-
lations, have algebraic signs which indicate the nature of the rela-
tionship. Once again, positive regression coefficients mean that older
people, nonwhites, females, persons with higher occupational status,
and persons with higher income agree with a statement more often
than their counterparts. The most important difference between
multiple regression coefficients and correlation coefficients is that the
regression coefficient for a social characteristic represents the unique
relationship of that characteristic to the opinion statement after the
relationships of the other social characteristics have been controlled
for. This difference is not apparent from looking at a table of multi-
ple regression coefficients, but it means that multiple regression
coefficients are statistically more sophisticated than correlation
coefficients.
A multiple correlation coefficient (R), and the square of that sta-
tistic (R2), called "R-square," are customarily presented in associa-
tion with a multiple regression analysis. The multiple correlation
coefficient, R, shows the total correlation of all five social character-
istics with the opinion statement. It varies between 0 and 1.00 and
employs no algebraic sign. The R2 statistic is the only one which can
be given a common-sense percentage interpretation. It shows the
percent of the variation in response to each opinion statement which
is explained or accounted for by the five social characteristics in
combination. As is not uncommon in social science research, the R 2
statistics are fairly low, indicating that many other social and psy-
209. See H. BLALOCK, supra note 203, at 357.
210. N. NIE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER, & D. BENT, STATISTICAL PACKAGE
FOP THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1975).
June 1978]
Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:1045
chological characteristics in addition to the five studied also affect
these opinion statements.
The multiple regression analyses for the twenty-one opinion
statements, including the five standardized regression coefficients
and the R and R2 statistics, are shown in Table 9. The highest re-
gression coefficient for each opinion statement is starred to facilitate
evaluation of the results.
TABLE 9
REGRESSION ANALYSES OF FIVE SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND
TWENTY-ONE OPINION STATEMENTS IN SAMPLES OF THE GEN-







1. Better to let guilty go freea
2. Police should use force
3. Capital punishment effective
4. Courts too easy on young
5. Police should arrest suspi-
cious
6. Taking fifth amendment is
hiding
7. Police often lie for one
anothera
8. Older people wiser
9. Young respect law less
0. Several charges, guilty of one
1. Police arrest with good rea-
son
2. Innocent are often trieda
3. Obedience to authority
important
4. Defendant must prove
innocenceb
5. Vote guilty despite lack of
evidenceb
9. Follow DA on indictment
0. Waive right and let DA ask
questions
1. Change vote to go with
majority
2. Follow DA since he knows
the evidence
3. DAs conceal evidence for
indictmenta





















.28* -. 03 .08 -. 26
.29* .00 .03 -. 07
-. 12 .16* -. 09 .03
.22* .01 .00 -. 09
.30* .13 .01 .08
.22* -. 01 .16 -. 17
.18 -. 32* .07 -. 20














































.29* .03 -. 01 -. 17 -. 06 .37 .13
-continued-
* Highest regression coefficient for each statement is starred.
a. These statements were phrased in a "liberal" manner.
b. For statements 14, 15, and 24, where only two choices were given, the regression
coefficient was computed for picking the answer indicated.
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Overall, Table 9 confirms the conclusion that age is the most im-
portant social characteristic in relation to the opinion statements in
the general public and the petit juror samples and that it is second in
importance to income in the sample of grand jurors. In the sample of
the general public, age has the strongest relationship to twelve of the
twenty-one statements; in the petit juror sample, age has the highest
regression coefficient for nine of the statements. In the grand juror
sample, however, income has the strongest relationship to nine state-
ments, 21' while age is the most important characteristic for seven.
B. Petit Jurors Multiple
Correla-
Standardized Regression Coefficients tions
ion Statements
Better to let guilty go freed
Police should use force
Capital punishment effective
Courts too easy on young
Police should arrest suspi-
cious
Taking fifth amendment is
hiding
Police often lie for one
anothera
Older people wiser
Young respect law less
Several charges, guilty of one
Police arrest with good reason





Vote guilty despite lack of
evidenceb
Follow DA on indictment
Waive right and let DA ask
questions
Change vote to go with
majority
Follow DA since he knows
the evidence


































































-. 02 -. 20
-. 02 -. 19
-. 09 .04
-. 18 -. 04
-. 09 -. 18
-. 10 -. 24*


















.25* -. 03 .14 -. 09 -. 07
-continued-
* Highest regression coefficient for each statement is starred.
a. These statements were phrased in a "liberal" manner.
b. For statements 14, 15, and 24, where only two choices were given, the regression
coefficient was computed for picking the answer indicated.
211. The data in Table 9 support the additional conclusion that occupation and income
groups are cognizable. The multiple regression coefficients for occupation and income show a
strong relationship between these characteristics and attitudes for many of the opinion state-



































1. Better to let guilty go freea
2. Police should use force
3. Capital punishment effective
4. Courts too easy on young
5. Police should arrest suspi-
cious
6. Taking fifth amendment is
hiding
7. Police often lie for one
another
a
8. Older people wiser
9. Young respect law lesi
10. Several charges, guilty of one
11. Police arrest with good rea-
son
12. Innocent are often tried
a
13. Obedience to authority
important
14. Defendant must prove
innocenceb
15. Vote guilty despite lack of
evidenceb
19. Follow DA on indictment
20. Waive right and let DA ask
questions
21. Change vote to go with
majority
22. Follow DA since he knows
the evidence
23. DAs conceal evidence for
indictment a







































.17 .12 .30 .09
-. 12 -. 24* .37 .14
.01 -. 16 .38 .15
-. 09 -. 14 .31 .09
-. 20 -. 12 .45 .21
-. 22 -. 14 .62 .38
.18 .11 .33 .11
.07 -. 40* .58 .34
.15 -. 28 .50 .25
.09 -. 29* .40 .16
-. 10 -. 27* .31 .09
.01 -. 09 .22 .05
-. 15 -. 11 .55 .31
.01 -. 11
.01 -. 21*
-. 12 -. 02
-. 08 -. 01
.04 .02
-. 10 -. 10
-.17* .30 .09
-. 18 .44 .20




-. 08 .23* .06 -. 09 .03 .25 .06
.30* .05 -. 19 -. 01 -. 12 .39 .15
* Highest regression coefficient for each statement is starred.
a. These statements were phrased in a "liberal" manner.
b. For statements 14, 15, and 24, where only two choices were given, the regression
coefficient was computed for picking the answer indicated.
occupational and income groups differ in knowledge, expertise, and attitudes on matters of
importance in jury service.
One researcher interviewed jurors following trial in 23 cases. He found that particularized
occupational knowledge or experience appeared to have affected the decision in eight of the 16
civil cases studied and that occupational bias played a part in four of the seven criminal cases
studied. Broeder, OccupationalExpertise and Bias as Affecting Juror Behavior: A Preliminary
Look, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1079 (1965).
Data presented in SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 197, support
the conclusion that income groups are cognizable. Nationwide samples were questioned about
criminal justice issues, and the results show a strong relationship between attitudes and in-
come. In 1975, respondents in 13 selected American cities were asked: "How safe do you feel
or would you feel about being out alone in your neighborhood during the day?" Of those with
incomes under $3,000 and those with incomes from $3,000 to $5,000, only 3 1% and 32% respec-
tively answered "very safe." By contrast, of those with incomes from $15,000 to $20,000, from
$20,000 to $25,000, and over $25,000, fully 53%, 56%, and 61% respectively offered that answer.





Young Adults as a Cognizable Group
The multiple regression analysis thus shows that age is the most im-
portant of these social characteristics in relation to attitudes which
are important injury deliberations. The stronger correlations for age
are not the accidental result of its correlations with the other social
characteristics. Rather, they show the greater impact of age upon a
person's opinion, independent of his or her sex, race, occupation, or
income.
In sum, the data support the following conclusions. First, there
are significant differences in attitudes between younger and older
people in all three samples for nearly all of the twenty-one opinion
statements. Second, the differences in attitudes generally progress
systematically from the youngest to the oldest age groups. Third, in
most cases, the greatest differences in attitudes occur between the
youngest and oldest age groups. Fourth, the correlations between
attitudes and age are stronger than the correlations between attitudes
and race, sex, occupation or income. Fifth, these stronger correla-
tions are not due to the correlation of age with one of the other social
characteristics mentioned; age independently affects attitude.
CONCLUSION
In the 1940s, courts assumed that a broad range of groups were
cognizable. The danger of bias from the exclusion of an identifiable
group and the possibility that its exclusion would cause a distinct
"flavor" to be lost and would undermine the cross-sectional ideal
warranted the recognition that a group was cognizable. More re-
cently, courts have required proof that groups satisfy newly articu-
lated criteria of cognizability. By too stringently applying these
criteria, courts have insulated discrimination in jury selection from
effective challenge.
Even by modem standards, Part III above demonstrates that
young adults are cognizable. They are distinct and identifiable; they
share attitudes and experiences which cannot be represented ade-
quately by their elders; and their underrepresentation on juries re-
sults in bias against young criminal defendants and distorts the
deliberative process. In light of this convincing evidence, courts
Another group of respondents was asked whether or not they agreed that law enforcement
agencies should be tougher than they are now in dealing with crime and lawlessness. Only
73% of those with incomes under $3,000 agreed, compared to 88% of those with incomes over
$15,000. Id. at 316 table 2.29. Similarly strong relationships between income and attitudes
were found in questions dealing with the death penalty and legalization of marijuana. Gener-
ally, lower-income people were less likely to favor the use of the death penalty or legalization
of marijuana than higher-income people. Id at 327 table 2.61, 342 table 2.91.
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should take judicial notice that young adults are cognizable, without
requiring proof case by case.
212
Although young adults meet the modem test, other groups might
be unable to present as clear or dramatic evidence of their
cognizability. In such cases, courts should reconsider the strict appli-
cation of cognizability criteria. If a community group is sufficiently
large and can be identified easily by questions on jury-qualification
questionnaires, it should not be denied recognition simply because
the boundaries of the group are somewhat arbitrary. Moreover,
courts should use their common sense in determining whether a
given group shares common attitudes and experiences which cannot
be represented adequately by others. Although courts reasonably
can ask those seeking to establish the cognizability of particular
groups to submit proof on the issue, they should not necessarily re-
quire movants to submit proof as complex or sophisticated as that
presented above.
Of course, the state has an administrative interest in selecting ju-
ries through flexible methods. But courts can protect that interest
when evaluating the merits of a jury selection complaint. To invoke
that interest as a justification for denying cognizability is irrational,
for it broadly and unnecessarily disqualifies entire groups from any
judicial help in securing representation on juries.
If additional groups are recognized, the result will be more repre-
sentative juries. As the Supreme Court stated in Smith v. Texas, "it
is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments
of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the
community.1213 Continued failure to extend cognizability to com-
munity groups can only undermine the vitality and integrity of the
jury as a democratic institution.
212. In exceptional cases, courts might be justified in refusing to take judicial notice of the
cognizability of the young. For example, in an isolated, conservative, rural community, the
young might be less likely to have distinct attitudes than in a more urban setting. In such a
community, the court could properly require specific proof of the attitudes of the community's
young adults. But this Article's argument for cognizability has been sufficiently strong that
these exceptions should be rare.
213. 311 U.S. at 130.
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY METHODOLOGY
The survey was designed to elicit attitudes of a cross section of
the Queens County population and to determine whether there are
significant variations in attitude among people in age, sex, race, oc-
cupation, and income groups concerning the criminal justice system
and petit and grand jury service. A questionnaire (Exhibit 1) was
developed by Eric Swanson, Elissa Krause, Donald Zeigler, and Jay
Schulman, and consultation was provided by Richard Christie and
Robert Buckhout. Questions were included which would reflect a
wide range of attitudes toward law and the legal system and toward
petit and grand jury service.
Names of persons to be interviewed were taken from three
sources-the Queens County petit jury rolls, grand jury rolls and the
telephone book. Although both petit and grand jurors in Queens
County ultimately come from the general population and grand ju-
rors are selected from among persons qualified to serve as petit ju-
rors, the selection procedures for both petit and grand jurors involve
many subjective judgments by personnel of the County Clerk's of-
fice. Because the selection procedures are not random, it could not
be assumed that the attitudes of petit jurors are representative of the
attitudes of the general population or that the attitudes of grand ju-
rors are representative of the attitudes of either of these groups. In
fact, the survey results show significant disparities in response to
many of the opinion statements in the questionnaire among the three
groups. Only by sampling all three groups could a complete picture
of their attitudes emerge.
Most interviewers were Legal Aid attorneys and law students
who were summer volunteers with the Legal Aid Society. Interview-
ers were trained by Eric Swanson and other members of the staff of
the National Jury Project, including Elissa Krause and Lee O'Brien.
Interviews of petit jurors and members of the general public were
conducted between approximately 6:00 and 9:30 p.m. Monday
through Thursday for a four-week period commencing Monday,
July 26, 1976. The grand jurors were surveyed during the evening
hours from September 7 to 9, 1976.
Random Telephone Sample of the General Public
The sample universe consisted of all persons between the ages of
18 and 75 living in a household with a telephone. Approximately
640 telephone numbers were taken at random from the 1975-1976
Queens telephone directory. The numbers chosen were not called.
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Instead, they became "seeds" for the development of new numbers.
The final phone sample was derived by adding one digit to the seed
numbers (e.g, 978-0970 became 978-0971). This process effectively
randomized the numbers and eliminated possible bias due to the fact
that some eligible respondents have unlisted phone numbers.
Interviewers were given computer grids (Exhibit 2)AI to deter-
mine which person to interview at each phone number reached. The
purpose of the grid was to eliminate any bias by reason of age- or
sex-related phone answering patterns and thus insure that the sample
was truly random. The interviewers were instructed that upon
reaching a household, they should determine the total number of
persons between the ages of 18 and 75 in the household and locate
this number on the horizontal axis. They should then ask how many
of the people in this age group were males and locate this number on
the vertical axis. By looking in the box on the grid at the point of
intersection, the interviewers would determine which household
member to interview-e.g., the "second oldest female," the "young-
est male," the "oldest male," etc. Interviewers were instructed to
speak only to the person assigned by the grid.
A standard introduction was provided for interviewers to obtain
the necessary preliminary identifying information. Interviewers
were instructed to record on their call-record sheets all calls except
disconnected numbers reached during the course of the random tele-
phone survey. A total of 232 interviews was completed.
Retit Juror Sample
The sample universe consisted of the approximately 200,000 per-
sons on the petit jury rolls in Queens County. Individual names
were drawn from the set of completed petit jury questionnaires of
qualified petit jurors by choosing every twentieth questionnaire.
Eight hundred forty-six names were drawn from file drawers labeled
1973; 845 names were taken from file drawers labeled 1974; and 823
names were drawn from file drawers labeled 1975. The name, age,
and phone number of each person selected were written on a three-
by-five index card.
The sample was then stratified as follows. The index cards were
sorted into decades; that is, cards of people in their 20s were placed
together, cards of people in their 30s were placed together, and so
forth. There were no persons aged 18 or 19. Cards for people over
Al. Exhibit 2 is an example of a grid. A large number of different grids were generated
by a computer in order to randomize the selection of respondents.
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age 75 were excluded because they are not eligible for jury duty. A
subsample of 300 names was drawn at random from six age groups
in numbers sufficient to insure that each age group was represented
in proportion to its numbers in the population as a whole. The ap-
propriate percentage to be chosen from each age group was deter-
mined from 1970 census data. The percentage chosen from each age
group was as follows:
20s- 22.2% 40s,- 19.7% 60s - 16.0%
30s - 15.6% 50s - 20.3% 70-75 - 6.2%
Sampling was also controlled so that equal numbers of persons from
each of the years 1973, 1974, and 1975 were included.
Interviewers were given the index card showing the respondent's
name, phone number, and age. They were instructed to ask for the
respondent by name, confirm that they had the right person, and
interview no one else. Two hundred twenty-nine interviews were
completed from the petit-jury-pool sample.
Grand Juror Sample
The sample of grand jurors came from two sources. The first
source was the Queens County Grand Jurors Liable Register for
1975. Data had previously been collected by the Legal Aid Society
on the race, sex, occupation, and age of every third person on that
Register. However, attempts to contact these people by telephone
revealed that there were far too few women, nonwhites, and young
people in this sample to draw reliable conclusions. Additional
names of people in these specific categories were drawn from the
1974 Liable Register to complete the survey. This process of over-
sampling ensured that women, nonwhites, and young people were
surveyed in sufficient numbers so that the answers obtained were
typical of people in these groups. Subsequently, these oversampled
groups were weighted back to their original proportions so that the
overall survey results would accurately reflect the attitudes of
Queens County grand jurors as a whole. Appendix B describes this
and other standard statistical weighting procedures utilized in the





RESPONDENT'S NAME: PHONE NO:
SOURCE:
Hello Mr./Ms. . My name is_. I'm work-
ing with the Legal Aid Society of New York. We're doing a public opinion
survey of peoples' attitudes towards the criminal justice system. The court
has granted us permission to conduct this survey. I'd like to take a few
minutes of your time to ask your opinions. Everything you say will be kept
completely confidential. OK?
(If appropriate: refer to sampling grid.)
For the first set of questions I'm going to read some opinion statements.
For each statement would you please tell me whether you agree strongly,
agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly. There are no
right or wrong answers. We're only interested in your opinions.
INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERVIEWERS:





READ. 9. don't know
Repeat scale as often as necessary until you are sure that respondent
has it clearly. If respondent only answers "agree" or "disagree" be
sure to ask "somewhat or strongly?"
CIRCLE CORRECT NUMBER
1. It is better to let some guilty people go free
rather than risk sending innocent people to jail.
2. Police should not hesitate to use force to main-
tain order.
3. Capital punishment is more effective than a life
sentence in keeping people from committing
murder.
4. The courts allow young people to get away with
too much too easily.
5. Police should be allowed to arrest and question
suspicious looking persons to determine whether
they have been up to something illegal.
6. A witness who takes the fifth amendment is
probably hiding his or her guilt of a crime.
7. Police will often lie to cover up for one another.
8. In tough situations, older people almost always
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9. Young people have less respect for law than
older people. 1 2 3 4 9
10. A person accused of several different crimes is
probably guilty of at least one of them. 1 2 3 4 9
11. The police don't make arrests unless they have
good reason to believe that a crime has been
committed. 1 2 3 4 9
12. Too often, the government brings people to trial
who are really not guilty. 1 2 3 4 9
13. Obedience to authority is the most important
virtue children should learn. 1 2 3 4 9
NOW I HAVE A FEW QUESTIONS ON THE JURY SYSTEM.
14. In criminal cases, the judge instructs the jury that the defendant
must be considered innocent unless proven guilty. However, many
people think that a defendant has the responsibility to prove his or her
innocence. If you were a member of a jury in a criminal case, would
you follow the judge's instructions or would you want the defendant to
prove innocence?
1. followjudge's instructions
2. defendant must prove innocence
15. If you were a member of a jury in a criminal case and truly be-
lieved that the person on trial was guilty but the evidence didn't prove
it, would you vote to find the person guilty or not guilty?
1. guilty 2. not guilty
16. Have you ever been called for jury service?
1. yes-GO TO Q. 16A
2. no-skip to Q. 17
16A. Did you actually serve on a jury?
1. yes 2. no 8. doesn't apply
17. Have you heard of a grand jury?
1. yes--GO TO Q. 18
2. no-skip Q. 18.
18. Can you tell me in your own words
what a grand jury does?
PROBE ONCE
INTERVIEWER: READ DESCRIPTION OF GRAND JURY TO ALL
RESPONDENTS.
To put it briefly, this is what a grand jury does-
The grand jury does not decide whether a person is guilty or innocent.
Rather, the District Attorney presents his case and the grand jury decides
whether he has enough evidence to make a person stand trial on criminal
charges. A judge is n6t present at a grand jury proceeding. [When the




Would you agree or disagree with the following statements?
INTERVIEWER: AFTER EACH RESPONSE ASK, "SOMEWHAT OR
STRONGLY?" and CIRCLE THE CORRECT NUMBER..
19. If a District Attorney strongly recommends an indict-
ment, grand jurors should go along with the recom-
mendation.
20. Grand jurors rarely need to exercise their right to ask
questions of witnesses because they can rely on the
District Attorney to ask all necessary questions.
21. During deliberations, if one grand juror disagrees
with the rest of the jurors that person should change
his or her vote to go along with the majority.
22. Since the District Attorney is more familiar with the
evidence the grand jury should always follow his rec-
ommendations.
23. District Attorneys sometimes conceal evidence from
a grand jury in order to get an indictment.
24. Do you think Society would be better served if the
grand jury represented all segments of the commu-
nity or if it was composed of older, more experienced
people?
1. all segments 2. older, experienced people
25. WHY?
1 2349
1 2 3 4 9




NOW I'M SUPPOSED TO ASK YOU A FEW MORE BACKGROUND
QUESTIONS FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES ONLY.
26. In what year were you born?
27. What kind of work do you do?
What industry do you work in?
IF HOUSEWIFE, STUDENT, UNEMPLOYED OR RETIRED, FIND
OUT PAST JOB OR PART-TIME WORK.
28. 1. Under $5,000
2. Between $5,000 and $10,000
3. Between $10,000 and $15,000
4. Between $15,000 and $20,000
5. Between $20,000 and $25,000
6. Over $25,000
29. We are all Americans, but what country
did your family originally come from?
Is English your native language?
1. yes 2. no
30. How often do you attend religious services?
1. more than once a week
2. weekly
3. several times a month
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4. once a month or less
5. never
31. What is your race?
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION.
FILL IN AFTER INTERVIEW IS COMPLETED.
AGE - SEX
EXHIBIT 2
Page 855 Seed = 421,637
Eligible Number of Eligible Respondents
Males 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 YF 2 OF YF 3 OF YF OF 4 OF
1 F YF 2 OF 2 OF M 2 YF M
2 YM OM OM YM OM 3 OF OM
3 OM YM 2 OM YF 2 YF 2 OF
4 YM OM OF 2 YM OF
5 YM OM 20M 30M
6 3 YM YM YM
7 30M 3 OM
8 YM
Key: 0 = Oldest Y = Youngest
M = Male F = Female 1,2,3, . . . etc. = First, Second, Third ....
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APPENDIX B: STATISTICAL WEIGHTING PROCEDURES
Because young persons are generally underrepresented, special
efforts were made in conducting the public opinion survey to select a
disproportionately large number of the young so that results for this
group would have greater statistical reliability. Consequently, the
percentages of young people in the petit juror and grand juror sam-
ples were proportionately larger than the percentages in the actual
petit jury and grand jury pools. There were also small differences
between the age distribution of the people in the sample of the gen-
eral public and the age distribution of the adult population of the
county as a whole. Thus, before the data could be analyzed, the four
age groups in all three samples had to be restored to their correct
proportional frequencies. This was done by the standard process of
statistical weighting.BI
Table 10 presents the number and percentage of persons in each
age group in the samples before and after weighting. The left col-
umn for each sample gives the actual percentage of the respective
population, by age group. The middle column lists the number and
percentage in each sample before weighting and the right column
lists the number and percentage after weighting.
The weighting process can be illustrated by examining the data
from the petit juror sample. Of the persons on the petit jury rolls,
13.4% are between the ages of 18 and 30; however, 18.3% of the petit
jurors sampled were in this age group. Thus, the 18-30 age group
was overrepresented in the sample of petit jurors. To correct this
overrepresentation, a fractional weight of 0.67 was accorded to each
person in the group. The 42 persons were subsequently counted as
28 persons, or 12.3% of the weighted sample, which is closer to their
actual percentage (13.4%) in the petit jury pool. By contrast, persons
between the ages of 61 and 75 constitute 25.6% of the people in the
petit jury pool but only 19.2% of the petit jurors sampled. To correct
this underrepresentation, those in the 61-75 age group were given a
weight of 1.36, restoring them to 25.9% of the weighted sample.
The weights assigned in the general public and petit juror sam-
ples were designed to make the total number of persons in the sam-
ples before and after weighting as nearly identical as possible.
However, weighting in the grand juror sample presented a special
problem requiring a different procedure. People between the ages of
BI. For a general discussion of this process, see N. NIE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEIN-
BRENNER, & D. BENr, supra note 210.
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18 and 30 constitute only 5.3% of the people on the grand jury rolls.
Seventeen of these youngs adults were interviewed, and they consti-
tuted 14.4% of the sample of 118 grand jurors. If they had been
given an appropriate fractional weight to correct their overrepresen-
tation, the number of young adults would have been reduced from
TABLE 10
NUMBER AND PERCENTAGES OF PERSONS IN EACH AGE GROUP IN
THE SAMPLES OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC, PETIT JURORS AND


































































TOTAL 100.0 118 100.0 312 99.9
* The figures listing the percentages of people in each age bracket for the petit and grand













17 to 6. Because the weighted sample would have been very small,
rounding error in computing the weighted number of persons would
have interfered seriously with the accuracy of subsequent statistical
analysis. To overcome this problem, the 18-30 age group was
weighted at 1.00 so that the 17 persons were still counted as 17. All
other age groups were then given weights proportionately greater
than 1.00 in order to restore the proper age distribution. This proce-
dure increased the sample size of grand jurors from an actual total of
118 to a weighted total of 312. Increasing the total sample size in this
manner does not alter the results in any way since all the statistics
presented depend on relative proportions rather than absolute sam-
ple size.
The primary reason for weighting is to insure that the samples
properly represent age distribution in the population; however, there
were also race and sex disparities between the composition of the
samples and the composition of the populations from which the sam-
ples were drawn. In a test run, the samples were weighted simulta-
neously by age, sex, and race, except that petit jurors were weighted
only by age and sex since the racial composition of the petit jury rolls
was not available. The complete set of correlations between the five
social characteristics and the 21 opinion statements was then com-
puted with the samples weighted by all the characteristics. The re-
sults were virtually identical to those computed when the samples
were weighted only by age. Therefore, all the data presented here
are weighted only by age.
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APPENDIX C: TABLE 11
1107
PERCENTAGE IN EACH CATEGORY OF FIVE SOCIAL CHARACTERIS-
TICS GIVING THE MOST CONSERVATIVE RESPONSE TO TWENTY-
ONE OPINION STATEMENTS IN SAMPLES OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC
(GP), PETIT JURORS (PJ), AND GRAND JURORS (GJ)*
Opinion
Statements Age Race Sex Occupation Income
18- 31- 46- 61- S A~ 0 =5 .
30 45 60 75 __ -0 E 6 00 W c .; ;;Cni 0-A
GP48 3848 64 50 44 40 58 54 58 52 46 67 58 31 62 50 45 50 55 27
#1 PJ 49554562 54 44 53 46 57 59 58 65 41 32 45 74 66 65 39 38 41
Gj 144 363642 39 40 46 27 37 50 48 44 69 22 35 33 50 44 42 34 26
GP 41 55 59 87 62 44 58 60 56 64 62 57 61 59 53 68 56 58 56 51 48
PJ 55 79 73 81 76 52 73 76 86 83 68 74 83 76 61 83 8469 71 75 68
GJ 56 49 77 80 77 61 72 78 100 100 56 81 62 84 63 88 91 75 64 71 54
GP 60 74 72 93 74 69 71 75 91 90 79 68 76 721 59 85 73 66 77 78 58
#3 PJ 72 82 86 86 85 66 84 81 100 91 78 86 84 83 74 61 90 83 76, 86 84
GJ 76 74 7370 81 35 74 67 63 0 54 82 100 80 61 75 85 53 79 64 72
GP 66 87 96 95 84 94 86 86-, 87 88 96 82 68 92 85 90 82 83 87 81 87
#4PJ 70 89 95 95 90 94 91 87 100 94 95 92 88 81 87 85 9687 86 92 93
G 71 82 80 92 87 83 84 89 74 100 76 89 100 91-78 100 91 80 83 80 86
GP 42 43 57 83 54 56 50 59 83 68 66 52 56 72 26 78 59 50 52 45 35
#5 PJ 33 44 61 67 58 38 54 62 73 68 54 60 51 39 48 74 74 54 50 56 34
GJ 35 25 53 66 59 44 54 56 100 0 72 63 58 50 44 50 81 6132 56 38
GP 39 59 64 74 58 58 54 62 58 64 75 48 56. 82 57 59 72 40 75 66 41
#6 PJ 33 50 52 90 56 54 57 58 78 64 54 63 6539 48 82 76 58 39 52 49
GJ 12 13 38 84 55 66 54 63 74 100 70 69 74 52 34 86 79 71 34 49 27
GP 28 28 39 42 34 33 28 39 42 26 47 41 7 32 27 38 41 36 33 22 25
-7PJ 30 33 33 41 39 13 35 37 53 14 37 44 30 15 48 52 42 29 33 34 34
GJ 501 48 1 42 40 47 20 43 43 26 0 59 53 38 27 41 43 38 26 54 45 28
GP 29 36 35 59 38 38 36 39 54 47 32 37 38 60 29 47 44 33, 36 17 42
#8 PJ 18 22 46 62 41 44 44 37 67 61 52 30 46 31 29 44 54 56 31 26 43
G 1J 8 4 23 62 35 63 37 43 0 100 57 52 57 23 27 71 79 56 14 29 13
OP 48 62 63 90 63 70 61 65 66 67 73 55 59 69 67 85 62 54 79 47 50
- PJ 42 63 80 80 71 81 71 76 90 92 74 71 54 64 65 89 94 69 71 56 64
GJ 138 37 55 86 64 87 66 73 74 100 63 72 67 73 59 88 93 90 58 56 47
GP 53 44 63 83 59 63 48 69 79 69 61 59 63 32 48 74 64 60 58 45 40
#10 PJ 38 54 60 77 60 64 55 73 58 74 63 64 59 43 53 39 85 73 51 52 33
GJ 41 28 37 66 47 65 51 53 74 50 40 52 57 61 42 75 72 45 43 39 34
GP 51 63 67 72 69 22 61 63 76 70 62 58 721 72 50 62 50 63 62 65 67
#11 PJ 58 59 73 90 75 52 71 83 100 81 83 76 67 62 60 89 95 71 70 54 75
GJ 47 82 72 77 75 70 74 73 63 100 90 79 64 66 71 88 90 62 82 76 55
GP 48 56 67 58 58 60 55 61 50 56 38 56 57 78 65 49 45 58 55 77 72
#12 PJ 62 66 54 62 61 50 57 71 77 45 58 74 47 45 64 78 53 52 5773 54
GJ 71 72 77 43 60 53 64 51 26 50 47 62 48 57 70 57 33 44 75 72 59
GP 61 71 75 90 72 78 72 73 86 96 87 63 87 74 56 89 80 66 76 76 49
#13 PJ 58 70 82 95 80 76 79 78 90 98 88 90 73 67 55 89 100 90 70 53 82
GJ 41 34 78 93 76 90 77 80 100 100 84 89 88 74 60 100 100 80 58 75 66
* The most conservative response is "agree" on statements 2-6, 8-11, 13, and 19-22; "disagree" on
statements 1, 7, 12, and 23; "defendant must prove innocence" on 14; "vote guilty" on 15; and "older,
experienced people" on 24.




Statents Age Race Sex Occupation Income
o iC
A! : J. ;;-
18- 31- 46- 61- C. C. E'~ ~30 45 60 75 z 6 no.U i , O 0.- - °
5M5_! M g 6
GP 40 36 45 61 40 69 34 56 76 51 45 36 66 36 22 62 61 41 34 43 23
J14PJ 36 16 28 40 30 21 28 38 20 36 32 39 24 21 20 22 64 34 26 13 14
GJ 12 4 23 30 22 33 22 30 74 0 21 34 34 6 16 43 41 24 19 17 10
GP 23 21 19 34 24 19 21 26 35 26 38 22 19 16 14 33 23 23 19 31 14
#15P 22i 14 23 26 23 13 24 12 47 30 26 15 12 24 18 18 32 26 20 10 20
G 12 13 9 47 28 35 25 40 74 100 30 36 36 18 13 86 35 31 5 20 19
GP 44 39 49 62 50 33 36 58 51 43 44 63 59 42 26 65 52 50 40 32 24
19 PJ 27 30 39 41 38 14 34 53 40 45 37 37 3& 31 28 33 34 39 32 45 28
GJ 29 8 12 26 22 7 18 20 37 0 15 21 52 18 13 25 44 9 21 16 9
GP 12 20 31 41 24 30 20 31 68 25 26 28 30 18 9 47 39 25 7 20 10
'2OPJ 20 13 26 47 32 5 28 35 20 3 38 33 15 13 28 22 56 34 24 20 12
GJ 6 4 15 38 21 40 24 24 0 100 II 42 46 0 15 75 35 14 7 36 5
GP 7 7 8 33 12 12 9 16 4 10 29 5 12 20 7 24 26 9 9 6 0
#21PJ 2 9 13 18 13 8 12 16 10 36 12 9 9 5 2 26 14 29 2 5 4
G 0 0 3 25 12 21 II 20 0 50 0 24 34 0 8 38 29 17 10 0 0
GP 13 18 28 66 30 17 24 34 61 31 30 30 29 32 14 60 33 28 15 13 19
#22 PJ 10 9 20 37 23 8 20 23 10 42 32 24 II II 10 1' 35 30 19 I1 8
GJ 6 0 9 28 15 28 16 17 0 50 51 20 17 12 6 50 44 17 10 7 2
GP 13 30 36 29 26 30 28 28 33 28 40 24 28 14 24 13 16 36 38 29 33
PJ 24 42 21 37 10 29 29 28 33 36 39 33 25 22 22 52 47 35 29 21 12
GJ 36 24 42 41 41 24 41 36 26 0 23 35 38 52 43 57 12 18 44 33 38
GP 10 18 25 50 23 28 24 25 50 36 32 I1 24 18 15 38 28 19 24 30 9
-24 PJ 10 14 32 47 30 25 28 44 22 36 46 31 24 20 18 30 46 36 24 22 18
G 6 8 15 45 25 40 32 23 37 50 0 44 29 20 22 38 44 45 5 16 20
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APPENDIX D: TABLE 12
The demographic characteristics of the Queens County popula-
tion are compared with the characteristics of the United States popu-
lation in the table.
TABLE 12
COMPARISON OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF QUEENS
COUNTY AND GENERAL U.S. POPULATION
U.S. Queens
Age
Under 18 Years 34.3% 26.2%
18-64 55.9% 61.4%
65 and over 9.9% 12.4%






Native-born of foreign or
mixed parentage 11.8% 29.5%
Education
Persons 25 and over:.
median school years attended 12.1 Years 12.0 Years
Children in private elementary
schools 11.5% 35.8%
Economics
Median income $9,590 $11,555
Below poverty level 10.7% 5.5%
Incomes of $15,000 or more 20.6% 30.8%
In white-collar positions 48.2% 60.3%
These data from the 1970 United States Census show that the
Queens County population is distinctly older than the country's pop-
ulation. The median age of Queens County residents was 35.5 years,
7.4 years older than the median age of the country's population.
The racial make-up of Queens County differs little from that of
the national population. Nonwhites made up 14.7% of the Queens
County population and 12.5% of the population of the United States.
More significantly, however, 50.5% of Queens County was either for-
eign-bom or of foreign or mixed parentage. This compares to 16.5%
in the general population.
Of those Queens County residents 25 and over, the median num-
1110 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:1045
ber of years of schools attended, 12.0, is nearly identical to that for
the nation. But, substantially more children from Queens County are
privately educated (35.8% of the elementary school children in
Queens County but only 11.5% in the general population were in
private schools in 1970).
The percentage of Queens County residents in white-collar jobs
in 1970, 60.3%, was twelve points higher than the corresponding per-
centage of the nation's work force. The median income in 1970,
$11,555, was almost two-thousand dollars over the national median.
Five and a half percent of Queens County residents were living be-
low the poverty level compared with 10.7% in the United States. The
percentage of those earning $15,000 or more was 30.8% in Queens
County, 20.6% nationally.
